The Politics of Aspiration by unknown
The Politics of Aspiration   1
The Social Market Foundation
The Foundation’s main activity is to commission and 
publish original papers by independent academic and other 
experts on key topics in the economic and social ﬁelds, with 
a view to stimulating public discussion on the performance of 
markets and the social framework within which they operate.
The Foundation is a registered charity and a company limited 
by guarantee. It is independent of any political party or group 
and is ﬁnanced by the sale of publications and by voluntary 
donations from individuals, organisations and companies.
The views expressed in publications are those of the authors  
and do not represent a corporate opinion of the Foundation.
Chairman
David Lipsey (Lord Lipsey of Tooting Bec)









2   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   3
First published by
The Social Market Foundation, 
March 2007
The Social Market Foundation
11 Tufton Street
London SW1P 3QB
Copyright © The Social Market
Foundation, 2007
The moral right of the authors has been 
asserted. All rights reserved. Without 
limiting the rights under copyright reserved 
above, no part of this publication may be 
reproduced, stored or introduced into a 
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form 
or by any means (electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying, recording, or otherwise), 
without the prior written permission of both 
the copyright owner and the publisher of 
this book.
Contents
About the authors 4
Preface – Ann Rossiter 8
1. Progressive self-interest – the politics of poverty and  
aspiration – Jim Murphy MP 10
2. Poverty as an intergenerational phenomenon:  
bucking the trend – Dr Jo Blanden 21
3. Child poverty: avoiding a life sentence – Lisa Harker 32
4. Access to education and basic skills: the ﬁrst step  
on the ladder of achievement – Professor Paul Gregg and  
Lindsey Macmillan 41
5. Harnessing the aspirations of sick and disabled people:  
the story so far and a look into the future – Dr Roy Sainsbury 57
6. Cultures, belief and aspiration – Trevor Phillips 68
7. Aspiration and community – Sir Jonathan Sacks 79
Two case studies: making a difference 
8. The gateless wall: a discourse on participation –  
Camila Batmanghelidjh 90
9. The experience of Ninestiles School: a case study in  
making an educational difference – Sir Dexter Hutt 98
Designed by www.jadedesign.net
4   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   5
About the authors
Ann Rossiter, Social Market Foundation
Ann Rossiter joined the SMF in July 2003 as Director of 
Research and in February 2004 also took on the role of Acting 
Director before being appointed as Director in July 2005. 
Before joining the SMF, her career included a number of  
advisory roles in politics and policymaking. She spent four years 
at the BBC in the Political Research Unit and in political pro-
gramming, followed by four years working in parliament for  
Rt Hon John Denham MP and Glenda Jackson MP, on  
pensions and transport policy. She is a specialist in pensions  
policy and welfare reform. Other policy interests include 
employment and the operation of markets. Prior to joining 
the SMF, Ann worked for four years as a Director of Fishburn 
Hedges, the corporate communications consultancy, and for 
Lexington Communications. 
Jim Murphy MP, Department for Work and Pensions
Jim Murphy is the Minister of State for Employment and 
Welfare Reform at the Department for Work and Pensions, 
a position he has held since May 2006. He was previously 
appointed Parliamentary Secretary at the Cabinet Ofﬁce follow-
ing the General Election in May 2005. He was Parliamentary 
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Scotland from 
March 2001 until June 2002, when he was appointed to the 
government as a whip. Jim Murphy entered Parliament in  
May 1997 as MP for East Renfrewshire. He has enjoyed the 
biggest electoral swing from Conservative to Labour of any  
MP in Britain over the past decade.
Dr Jo Blanden, University of Surrey and Centre for Economic 
Performance, LSE
Jo Blanden is a lecturer in economics at the University of Surrey, 
a position she was appointed to in 2005. Previous to this, she 
spent ﬁve years as a researcher at the Centre for Economic 
Performance (CEP) at the London School of Economics, where 
she remains a research associate. Her research interests lie in 
family and labour economics. The majority of her work to date 
has investigated the impact of family background on future life 
chances. She has also written on UK industrial relations.
Lisa Harker, Department for Work and Pensions
Lisa Harker is an independent policy adviser specialising in 
issues related to families, poverty and social exclusion. In 
June 2006 she was appointed as an adviser on child poverty 
to the Department for Work and Pensions and her report 
‘Delivering on Child Poverty: What would it take?’ was pub-
lished in November 2006. She was previously Deputy Director 
of the Institute of Public Policy Research (2000-03), Chair 
of the Daycare Trust (2001-06) and is a director of Aspire 
Oxfordshire, a social enterprise that provides employment 
opportunities for homeless people.
Professor Paul Gregg and Lindsey Macmillan, University of 
Bristol
Paul Gregg is a professor in the Department of Economics, 
University of Bristol. He is also a member of the London 
Child Poverty Commission and a programme director at the 
Centre for Market and Public Organisation. Lindsey Macmillan 
is a research assistant at the Centre for Market and Public 
Organisation, University of Bristol.
Dr Roy Sainsbury, University of York
Roy Sainsbury is an assistant director of the Social Policy 
Research Unit at the University of York. His research projects 
have included work on sickness and disability, employment 
policy and social security beneﬁts. Current work includes the 
evaluation of the Pathways to Work pilots.
6   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   7
Trevor Phillips, Commission for Equality and Human Rights
Trevor Phillips is Chair of the new Commission for Equality 
and Human Rights, which will take over the work of Britain’s 
three existing equality commissions as well as new responsibili-
ties for equality and human rights in October 2007. Previously 
Trevor was Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality. 
Between 2000 and 2003, he was Chair of the Greater London 
Authority. Born in London in 1953, Trevor attended second-
ary school in Georgetown, Guyana, and then studied chemistry 
at Imperial College London. Between 1978 and 1980, he was 
president of the National Union of Students. He then went 
into broadcasting, becoming Head of Current Affairs at LWT 
in 1992. In addition to many newspaper articles and comment 
pieces, Trevor has co-written books on ethnicity and on the his-
tory of slavery.
Sir Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi
Sir Jonathan Sacks has been the Chief Rabbi of the United 
Hebrew congregations of the Commonwealth since 1991. He 
has earned international acclaim, both as a scholar and spiritual 
leader. At his installation as Chief Rabbi in 1991, Dr Sacks set 
out his vision of a reinvigorated Anglo-Jewry and launched it 
with a Decade of Jewish Renewal, followed by a series of inno-
vative communal projects. In September 2001 he began his 
second decade of ofﬁce with a call to Jewish responsibility and a 
renewed commitment to the ethical dimensions of Judaism. He 
was awarded a knighthood in the Queen’s birthday honours list 
in June 2005. Rabbi Sacks is the author of many books and has 
made numerous appearances on national radio, television and 
press interviews. 
Camila Batmanghelidjh, Kids Company
Camila Batmanghelidjh is founder and Director of Kids 
Company, a charity that delivers practical and therapeutic inter-
ventions to vulnerable inner-city children through 32 inner 
London schools, a children’s centre and an urban academy. She 
also set up The Place2Be, which offers emotional support and 
therapy in primary schools. Camila was born in Tehran and 
educated as a psychotherapist in the UK. She has more than six-
teen years of psychoanalytic experience and has written widely 
in this area.
Sir Dexter Hutt, Ninestiles Federation
Dexter Hutt attended schools in Guyana and England before 
graduating from Birmingham University. After leaving uni-
versity he taught in Handsworth and Coventry before taking 
up the headship of Ninestiles School in Birmingham in 1988. 
Ninestiles progressed from being a failing school to a top 
performer, and Dexter received a knighthood for his services 
to education. He is heavily involved in school improvement, 
both regionally and with the DfES. He is now Executive 
Headteacher of the Ninestiles Federation of Schools and Chief 
Executive of its training and consultancy company, Ninestiles 
Plus, which has supported school improvement in schools 
both nationally and internationally in Indiana and Cape Town. 
Dexter Hutt is also a commissioner for the Commission for 
Racial Equality.
Dr Simon Griffiths, Social Market Foundation
Simon Grifﬁths joined the SMF as Senior Research Fellow 
in January 2007 after completing a doctorate at the London 
School of Economics on the adoption of pro-market arguments 
amongst the British left during the 1980s and 1990s, issues on 
which he has published in major journals and in the media. He 
previously worked as a parliamentary researcher, taught politics 
at LSE, and carried out academic research in various capacities 
for the sociologist, Anthony Giddens. He focuses on public 
service reform for the SMF and is editor of the current collec-
tion.
8   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   9
including the national minimum wage, Sure Start, the Child 
Trust Fund, education reforms, active labour market policies, 
and the system of tax credits.
 The impact that the New Labour government will have 
had on social mobility will not be fully understood for at least 
a generation. However there are indications that social mobil-
ity is slowing or even going in the wrong direction.1 Certainly 
the gap between rich and poor is worsening, albeit not to the 
degree that would have been the case without the initiatives the 
government has undertaken.2 This suggests that further effort 
to identify and dismantle the barriers that prevent all citizens 
realising their potential should remain an important objective 
for Labour as it nears the mid-point of its third term in ofﬁce.
 The purpose of the collection of essays commissioned here 
is to deepen political understanding of the barriers to further 
social mobility and to the realising of personal aspiration, par-
ticularly among the most disadvantaged sections of society, and 
to identify further steps that the government can take to over-
come these barriers through clear, incisive analysis from leading 





Historically, one of the deﬁning political differences between 
those on the right and those on the left has been attitudes 
towards aspiration. The traditional response from the right 
has been to promote and encourage personal ambition but to 
regard this solely as a factor of personal effort. This “pulling 
yourself up by your bootstraps” approach to the politics of 
aspiration neglects the important and sometimes overwhelm-
ing barriers that stand in the way of both individual aspiration 
and its achievements. On the other hand, the traditional, class-
based, political analysis of the old left has tended to prove unat-
tractive to voters from all classes because it seemed to recognise 
those social and economic barriers without acknowledging the 
validity of the impulse to improve the lot of yourself and your 
family. 
 The complex interaction of forces and circumstances that 
conspires to keep those who are born in poverty in the same 
situation for the duration of their lives, and which make social 
exclusion a transgenerational phenomenon, is the subject of this 
collection. It presumes that ﬁghting social exclusion is both an 
ethical and an economic imperative: we have an obligation to 
address those conditions that prevent individuals from fulﬁlling 
their capabilities irrespective of their start in life, and which pre-
vent them imagining and achieving a different kind of future. 
Fairness in life chances is taken to be the primary objective.
 In coming to power, the New Labour government recog-
nised that it needed to take seriously the aspirations of citizens 
from all backgrounds but also that, for many people, the bar-
riers to personal and family achievement were overwhelming. 
Considerable effort has been expended in identifying and  
dismantling those barriers through a range of mechanisms, 
1 J Gershuny, Beating the 
Odds (1): Intergenerational 
social mobility from a human 
capital perspective and 
Beating the Odds (2): A new 
index of intergenerational 
social mobility (Institute 
for Social and Economic 
Research; Strategy Unit 
Report, 2002). 
 
2 J Hills, and K Stewart (eds.), 
A More Equal Society? New 
Labour, poverty, inequality and 
exclusion (The Policy Press, 
2005). 
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1. Progressive self-interest 




The politics of aspiration has always been the driving force 
behind political change. Across history it has sparked revolu-
tions, driven social progress, created trade unions and political 
parties, and changed the destiny of continents. 
 Today in the UK the party that best responds to the chang-
ing nature of public aspiration will dominate the next decade. 
In truth the real prize will not go to those who follow aspiration 
but to those who anticipate and shape it.
 Labour’s history is a binary one. Labour is either the party 
of personal and collective aspiration or a party of opposition. 
As New Labour enters its second decade in power, we should 
embrace aspiration as a driver of further reform of public servic-
es. We should also use it to reframe the debate and public policy 
on eradicating poverty.
 Historically, empowerment and aspiration have been inte-
gral to Labour governments’ approach to public service reform 
– but for occasional political and intellectual spasms when we 
seemed unwilling to compromise with the electorate.
 Both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown ensured that aspira-
tion is part of the essential architecture of New Labour. It is no 
coincidence that our three election victories have been concur-
rent with the largest uninterrupted period that Labour has ever 
remained consistently connected to the nation’s aspirations.
 The Labour Party was born of the aspiration of an age. 
Almost half a century later when Bevan published the NHS Bill, 
he deliberately placed power in the hands of the patient rather 
than GPs when he prevented the buying and selling of GPs’ 
patient rolls. As Michael Foot said: ‘Bevan desperately wanted 
the patient to have choice of GP practice. He saw it as the best 
safeguard against poor service from the GP.’3 
 In 1965, Tony Crosland, Secretary of State for Education 
and Science at the time, published the Organisation of Secondary 
Education on the introduction of comprehensive education and 
the abolition of the 11-plus. In the text, Crosland pronounced 
that ‘parents must have the ﬁnal decision’ over choice of second-
ary school. As a precursor to New Labour’s choice advisers in 
schools and hospitals some four decades later, the Crosland cir-
cular added: ‘but parents from less educated homes in particular 
should have a full explanation of the opportunities open to their 
children.’4 
 Innovation in public services has also traditionally been 
an essential component of Labour’s approach to overcoming 
material and generational poverty. In 1966, with the creation of 
Jennie Lee’s inspirational effort, the Open University, and with 
the wider expansion of the universities, Labour’s manifesto pro-
claimed ‘genuine equality of opportunity for millions of people 
for the ﬁrst time.’5 The introduction of family allowances by the 
Attlee government and child beneﬁt by Wilson’s government 
were also innovative, as was the way in which they were paid. 
Payments directly to the purse helped empower many working 
class mums.
No retreat from reform
The lessons of Labour history are also stark. If we stand still 
we will stagnate; momentum will be lost, possibly never to be 
recaptured. When the left has neglected challenges, the right 
has seen opportunity. When Gaitskill and others urged the party 
to make a property-owning democracy the social democratic 
objective, they were pilloried. Labour politicians ﬁrst discussed 
building council houses for sale, but allowed a vacuum to be 
ﬁlled by a different solution to that challenge. We anticipated 
aspiration, but we failed to act. So again today it is Labour’s 
role not only to match aspiration but also to anticipate it. And 
3 M Foot cited in N Timmins, 
The Five Giants: A biography 
of the welfare state 
(HarperCollins), p. 102. 
 
4 Department of Education 
and Science, The Organisation 
of Secondary Education, 
Circular 10/65, [‘The Crosland 
Circular’], (DES, 12 July 
1965).  
 
5 The Labour Party, Time for 
Decision (Election manifesto, 
1966), Part 4, Section 4.
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in a world where so much is becoming global, local, personal 
solutions will be demanded of the public services in the future. 
Today, this happens in some areas, in some circumstances, but 
not universally.
 In more recent times, we have made much greater use of 
competition from the private and voluntary sectors to drive 
up standards in all our public services. We have recognised 
the complex nature of disadvantage, and its corollary, that the 
monolithic structure of top-down services delivered from the 
centre will not effectively deal with the diversity of individual 
circumstances. And we’ve promoted local initiatives to focus on 
local solutions. 
 When people talk of change and reform in the context of 
government and the public sector, some talk of ‘reform fatigue’. 
They talk about reform as if there is an end point. There never 
will be. We need to continue to adapt services to new chal-
lenges. When the modern welfare state was created, the service 
side of the private sector in Britain was embryonic. People’s 
attitudes to services were shaped by their public sector experi-
ence. This has not been the case for some time now. As society 
has become more prosperous and the private sector has revolu-
tionised the services norm, expectations are increasingly set by 
interactions with the private sector.
 When the private sector adapts to changing circumstances, 
the language is very different. Commentators laud their ‘inno-
vation’; change is automatically looked upon as a good thing. 
The private sector changes to respond or, better still, to lead the 
market. If companies in the private sector do not change, they 
go out of business. But just because the public sector cannot 
‘go out of business’, it does not mean that we cannot learn from 
the private sector. We have our market, just like business does. 
Our equivalent is losing the public’s consent to fund progressive 
public services. So we need to go further in transforming the 
passive relationship between the citizen and the state into  
an active contract, with rights and greater responsibilities 
embedded within the system. We need to encourage a more 
active citizenry.
Choice is only part of the solution
Choice is not the solution to all the challenges facing public 
services. However, in putting choice at the forefront of reform, 
we have helped to transform public services. Today we are deliv-
ering a more complex and diverse range of services than ever 
before – from trust schools to new independent treatment and 
diagnostic centres – drawing on private and voluntary sector 
expertise across the public sector and using competition as a key 
driver to progress. It is not about an advanced social Darwinism 
or survival of the ﬁttest, but about harnessing the potential 
of the market through the effective management of contest-
ability and the creation of incentive structures that ensure that 
provision – no matter what its derivation – is underpinned by 
Labour’s progressive values.
 And we have made real progress. In my own constituency 
there has been genuine educational transformation. A decade 
ago the number of local children in private schools was 10.5%. 
Such has been the transformation in comprehensive schools 
that this year only 1.5% of newly enrolled pupils went to pri-
vate schools. Nationally, there are now 5,800 additional good 
or excellent primary and secondary schools today than in 1997. 
Exam results are at record levels and more young people are 
going to university. The biggest-ever NHS hospital building 
programme is underway; record numbers of doctors and nurses 
are treating record numbers of NHS patients; deaths from 
cancer and heart disease are falling. Waiting lists have fallen by 
almost 400,000; maximum waiting times for operations have 
been halved from eighteen months in 1997 to nine months 
in April 2004, and now virtually no one waits longer than six 
months, with the average much lower.
 But in a rapidly changing society – one facing new chal-
lenges of economic and demographic change – we have to go 
much further in the next decade. Many people now expect to 
get the best products from around the world at the touch of a 
button. They expect that same level of service from the public 
sector. Too often we seek to contextualise today’s public services 
with those of 1997, but increasingly the public compares the 
responsiveness of their public services not with what happened 
under the Tories but with their experiences of the best in today’s 
private sector. 
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Public servants – friends not foe
To retain electoral consent, taxpayers need to sense that public 
services are continuing to improve. Apart from personal experi-
ence, the greatest impact on public perception is the attitudes 
of people who work in the services. Yet we have at times been 
amateurish in our engagement with public servants. In the early 
days of New Labour this was, perhaps, understandable as we 
sought to prove that we were not captured by ‘producer inter-
ests’ or trade unions, and that we would govern for the nation 
and not for any one sectional interest. But in achieving this 
too many teachers, nurses and other public servants wrongly 
felt that we believed that they were part of the problem. In our 
communications we have relied on those who score poorest on 
the trust index, including ministers (22%), journalists (19%), 
managers (35%), trade union ofﬁcials (41%) and business lead-
ers (31%). We have not engaged enough with those who rate 
highly on the trust index, such as teachers (88%), police (61%) 
and doctors (92%).6
 A decade later we need greater subtlety in our relationship 
and communications with public servants. Of course reform 
will continue to pick up pace, but we need to take more people 
with us. Such an approach is crucial as we enter an era of more 
autonomy and less micro-management of national targets. 
Public servants also want improvement, not least because they 
are also taxpayers and customers of the services. A start would 
be a proper conversation about why we need change. Too often 
all that people hear is the ‘what’ of the change, without being 
involved in a conversation about the ‘why’. The debate is about 
process instead of purpose. We also need effective and direct 
two-way communications, which are more than a “thank you 
for your feedback, the contents of which have been noted”. 
Dialogue about ‘why’ further changes are essential also creates 
challenges for trade unions and others.
An end to the politics of charity
If we are to continue to make real progress we need to reframe 
the debate on poverty. We should also reﬂect on whether gov-
ernment should approach poverty differently. In the past we 
sometimes spoke of the politics of aspiration as though it was 
distinct from the politics of poverty, but the politics of aspira-
tion and the politics of poverty are two sides of the same coin. 
No one aspires for change more than many people from the 
poorest families trapped in the poorest areas and sometimes 
served by poorer quality public services. 
 There has been real and signiﬁcant progress in tackling 
poverty in our society. Since 1997 we have lifted 700,000 chil-
dren and one million pensioners out of relative poverty. There 
are one million fewer people on beneﬁts and 2.5 million more 
in work. And we have achieved growth with fairness. Between 
1979 and 1997 inequality in the UK rose faster and went fur-
ther than in any other major economy. But since 1997, growth 
has been more fairly shared – with incomes growing strongly 
for all groups, but with the poorest two-ﬁfths actually seeing 
larger proportional increases than others.
 Despite this improvement, entrenched pockets of depriva-
tion still undermine the progress we have made. We have not 
yet managed to crack the cycle of intergenerational poverty. 
Inequalities in aspiration of parents drive inequalities in attain-
ment for their children at schools.7 The aspirations of poorer 
children differ from those who are better off – from the presents 
children ask for on their birthday, to the careers they want 
when they grow up. If a boy’s parent is convicted of a criminal 
offence, he is twice as likely to be convicted himself. Relative 
generational mobility has fallen over time, and we are lagging 
behind Canada and the Nordic countries. Today we are paying 
the price for the policy failures of previous decades. The cycle of 
mobility, even at its peak, has been painfully slow. 
 There is a lazy analysis put forward by some commentators 
that because mobility has currently stalled, responsibility must 
lie with this administration; this assessment completely misun-
derstands the nature, drivers and timescales of social mobility. 
The time of greatest inﬂuence on an individual’s social mobil-
ity is in childhood. The time of optimum inﬂuence on today’s 
immobile 30-somethings was in the mid-1980s. Today’s immo-
bility is a legacy of the 1980s, not the past ten years.
 So while New Labour did not create this decade’s social 
immobility, we have a political and moral imperative to address 
it. But faced with the question ‘have we done everything we 
can to drive future mobility?’, the answer is clearly ‘no, not yet’. 
We must focus relentlessly on improving the life chances of all 
7 S Leitch, The Leitch Review 
of Skills: Prosperity for all in 
the global economy – world-
class skills (HMSO, 2006).
6 Ipsos MORI, Opinion of the 
Professions, (Ipsos MORI, 
2006), (available online at: 
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/
trust/truth.shtml).
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children and providing second chances for adults. In particular, 
skills investment is essential if we are to make lasting change.
 If we are to retain electoral consent for this enormous 
challenge we also need to reframe the debate. There has been a 
largely successful transformation in the language about inter-
national poverty. Over twenty years, the ‘charity’ of Live Aid in 
1985 has been replaced by the ‘self-dignity’ of Live 8 in 2005. 
The focus has switched from charity to dignity. However, there 
has not been a similar change of vocabulary in the conversation 
about domestic poverty. The discussion about poverty in the 
UK is too often still about a politics of charity not a politics of 
aspiration. It also relentlessly focuses on a soulless conversation 
about government targets rather than real people. 
 We should also reﬂect on whether poverty should have a 
higher proﬁle within the organisation of government. At the 
moment we rightly have a joined-up approach to better regula-
tion, with a powerful cross-departmental panel for regulatory 
accountability, chaired by the Prime Minister. Every new bill is 
forensically examined for its possible impact on public sector 
bureaucracy or new business burden. Additional burdens are 
compensated for by offsetting measures. We should create a 
similar challenge function across government on child poverty; 
every policy and new bill should be examined for its impact on 
poverty. It is not too much to suggest that we should co-ordi-
nate policy on child poverty as effectively as we do on unwanted 
paperwork.
 Our methods of tackling disadvantage must also inspire 
aspiration. The Institute of Public Policy Research has shown 
that the most substantial inequalities in society are not simply 
between income groups, but between those who own shares, 
pensions and housing, and those who rely solely on wages and 
beneﬁts. In the last decade the proportion of people with no 
assets has gone from 5% to 10%, while the value of assets, in 
particular housing, has grown substantially. Since 1997, house-
hold net wealth has grown by around 50% in real terms – with 
total household assets, including savings, pensions, life insur-
ance and housing, standing at over £6 trillion. 
 Asset-based welfare must then be integral to our think-
ing on the way forward. The number of ﬁrst-time buyers who 
were assisted by family and friends has grown from under 10% 
in 1995 to over 40% in 2005. This illustrates the increased 
importance of assets. The introduction of child trust funds for 
all children born from September 2002 is a farsighted example 
of where we have already made inroads in this area. It will mean 
that every child has the potential to have access to a ﬁnancial 
asset at the age of eighteen. We know that around 75% of par-
ents have taken up this opportunity. We need to consider where 
this asset-based approach can be taken forward in other aspects 
of public services and welfare provision. 
Progressive self-interest – a modern sense of social solidarity
If we are to retain the consent for our New Labour coalition, 
we need to reframe the debate about social justice and poverty 
and conceptualise it as part of a wider sense of aspiration. A 
modern sense of social solidarity can be based upon a renewed 
sense of progressive self-interest. 
 There is currently a democratic disconnection on domes-
tic poverty in the UK. Only 12% of people asked in a MORI 
survey said that to be a good citizen, it was extremely impor-
tant to support people who were worse off. Out of the twenty 
European countries surveyed, the UK had the second lowest 
tolerance threshold towards further redistribution to the poor.8 
Part of this reticence may be that when we speak about our 
determination to intervene to help the poorest, others perceive 
that we wish to place a cap on the aspirations of middle class 
families. 
 I often reﬂect upon my own personal experience. I grew 
up in one of Glasgow’s poorest housing schemes and I am now 
the MP for the most prosperous constituency in the whole of 
Scotland. These two places seem worlds apart, but in truth they 
are separated by just one street and a mile of open ground. For 
me the democracy of social justice question is captured by this 
personal experience. How can I continue to retain the permis-
sion of those who elected me, to support those whom I grew up 
with? In this context, relying on traditional collective solidar-
ity will not work. It is simply not enough if we are to secure 
continuing public consent for a progressive agenda. The inter-
national debate on poverty has moved on from the concept of 
charity, and so must we. 
 A different approach is also driven by electoral trends. 
8 B Duffy and R Robey, A New 
British Model? (Ipsos MORI, 
2006). 
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Fewer of those who beneﬁt ﬁnancially from Labour’s focus on 
social justice now vote. Conversely, those who derive no imme-
diate material advantage from Labour’s determination to eradi-
cate poverty are now an increasing proportion of those who 
actually vote. We should never lose focus on the electoral truism 
that, given demographic and turnout trends, Labour is only 
competitive because we have broadened our appeal. The 1964 
Wilson government struggled to get a 10% share of the AB 
vote; in 2005 Labour achieved 28%. Those voters must remain 
a building block of our success.
 There is also a clear connection between poverty and the 
decision not to vote, which, if anything, since the 1980s has 
become more pronounced. In the 2005 general election, over 
half of the 50 constituencies with the lowest voter turnout 
were among the 50 seats with the highest percentage of chil-
dren dependent on one or more beneﬁts, and with the highest 
number of people on incapacity beneﬁt. 
 Progressive self-interest is about making the wider connec-
tion between personal aspiration and the continuing right of the 
state to enable collective solutions that meet those aspirations. 
It is also about re-energising the consent for Labour’s values 
and policies. Attlee closes his autobiography by declaring his 
pride at living in ‘the greatest country in the world.’9 If we are 
to retain Attlee’s civic patriotism then we need a greater intoler-
ance of failure. In domestic policy every parent rightly wants the 
best for their children. Progressive self-interest encourages and 
celebrates that aspiration. But it also acknowledges that every 
child matters, and it is in all of our interests that we continue to 
invest in comprehensive education. The future prosperity of all 
our families is dependent on whether all of our citizens have the 
education and skills to compete. 
 In welfare we can’t afford to have more than two and a 
half million people on incapacity beneﬁt. It is a waste of human 
talent and affects our ability to prosper in a global economy. 
Perhaps more difﬁcult to argue, but also true, is that we cannot 
tolerate the current levels of criminal re-offending. We should 
rightly consider further ways of penalising repeat offenders, but 
we also have to invest in rehabilitation. Four out of ﬁve prison-
ers have the reading ability of an eleven year old; 65% have the 
numeracy skills of an eleven year old; and the economic costs 
alone of re-offending amount to £11 billion a year. Investment 
in offender skills is a crucial part of a ‘tough on crime’ policy. It 
is in all of our interests.
 Internationally, progressive self-interest, at least in part, 
already motivates demands for action on global warming. It 
also bolsters the now well-established sense that if we wish to 
prosper in relative safety we should have a far-reaching foreign 
policy, which on occasion includes UK involvement in nation 
building. In Afghanistan, for example, the case for our contin-
ued engagement can be made by a progressive self-interest that 
acknowledges that 90% of heroin in the UK traditionally comes 
from Afghan poppy ﬁelds. 
Conclusion
Aspiration created the Labour Party. If we are to retain the 
political and ﬁscal consent for Labour’s values we need to con-
tinue to embrace it. This means anticipating the almost limitless 
aspirations of the many and lifting the near-fatalistic intergen-
erational poverty of aspiration of the few. We should also have 
a renewed conﬁdence in eradicating poverty by transforming 
democratic attitudes towards domestic poverty and reframing 
the consent to go further. And we must not falter at the thought 
of further transformation of public services. 
 There are some who claim New Labour will wither when 
Tony Blair leaves Downing Street; but this ignores the nature 
of New Labour. It is about much more than one person. New 
Labour is the product of a collective and considered decision by 
the party as a whole in the 1990s that we wished to forge a dif-
ferent type of Labour Party. This remains the case.
 One of New Labour’s greatest political achievements is 
that we have repeatedly set the agenda. We must continue to 
do so. That agenda is one of aspiration. The challenge of our 
second decade is to successfully redeﬁne the progressive sense 
of personal aspiration enabled through the collective capac-
ity of the state. In doing so we can expose the bankruptcy of a 
Conservative philosophy of an atomised possessive individual-
ism, which holds that aspiration can only be met by escaping 
from the state and public services.
 Three decades ago Tony Crosland said: ‘What one gen-
eration sees as a luxury, the next sees as a necessity.’ Now the 
9 C Attlee, As It Happened 
(Viking Adult, 1954).
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timeline from luxury to necessity is not a generation, but at 
most a decade. People’s expectations and lifestyles are being 
transformed by technology. A decade ago mobile phones were 
the preserve of the more prosperous, now they are ubiquitous, 
with 96% of 18-24 year olds using them. In public services and 
politics too, the luxuries of one decade are the necessities of the 
next. Many radical reforms of New Labour’s early years, such as 
devolution, disabled rights and Bank of England independence, 
are now the established orthodoxy of today. Many of our great-
est achievements are now taken for granted. To emphasise this 
point, I remember talking with the assistant editor of a national 
newspaper about the Tory legacy of interest rates at 10% for 
more than four years and how we had made a decisive break 
from that era. I was amazed when he said: ‘That’s got nothing 
to do with what government is in power’!
 This phenomenon was as true in the ﬁrst days of the ﬁrst 
Labour government as it is today. In 1924, Sidney Webb, as the 
President of the Board of Trade, bemoaned the fact that after 
only eight months in power: ‘The Labour government seldom 
gets the credit for the very numerous works all over the coun-
try.’10 Like Webb, we cannot expect a belated sense of gratitude 
from an electorate who are rightly more interested in our vision 
about the future than retrospection about our achievements 
thus far. 
 So, as always in politics, the past is the context. The future 
is the contest.




At the beginning of 2006, the number of children in poverty 
in Britain stood at around 3.4 million,11 which is around 27% 
of the child population. The fact that this many children live 
in relative ﬁnancial hardship is a critical policy issue, and the 
government has committed to eradicating child poverty in the 
UK by 2020, although the ﬁrst target of a quarter reduction 
in the numbers in poverty between 1998-99 and 2004-05 was 
narrowly missed. To help meet these targets, successive Labour 
governments have implemented a number of programmes to 
improve the incomes of families with children, including the 
working families tax credit and the child tax credit.
 This concern about child poverty relates not just to the 
immediate impact of the poverty experience. The experience of 
poverty in childhood may inﬂuence social, economic and health 
outcomes in later life, leading to poverty in adulthood and con-
sequences for the next generation. It is this intergenerational 
aspect of poverty that most concerns policymakers. This chapter 
reviews the evidence on the extent to which poverty is transmit-
ted across generations, and offers a brief assessment of some of 
the reasons that poverty persists from parents to children.
 I begin by reviewing the empirical work on the extent to 
which parents’ income and poverty during an individual’s child-
hood years affects later life chances. In particular, I measure the 
‘persistence of poverty’ among children in the 1958 and 1970 
10 Labour Party, Work for 
the workless: Can Labour 
rule? (Labour Publications 
Department, 1924). 
11 Where a child is counted 
as poor if they are in a 
family that has income after 
housing costs below 60% of 
the population median – M 
Brewer, A Goodman, J Shaw 
and L Sibieta, Poverty and 
Inequality in Britain (Institute 
for Fiscal Studies, 2006).
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birth cohorts; that is, the extent to which growing up in poverty 
increases the chances of experiencing poverty in adulthood.12 
Measuring the intergenerational transmission of income and 
poverty is crucial to understanding the extent to which we  
need to be concerned about the impact of poverty on later  
generations. 
 However, understanding the extent of the problem is of 
limited help in shaping an appropriate policy response. In order 
to determine the extent to which poverty transmissions can be 
tackled by redistribution, we need to know the extent to which 
it is low income in itself that causes difﬁculties for children, and 
the extent to which it is the other, less manipulable, characteris-
tics of poor families that lead to later disadvantage. In the ﬁnal 
part of the analysis described here I turn this question on its 
head and ask which characteristics help poor children to ‘buck 
the trend’ and avoid poverty in their own adult lives.13
The intergenerational transmission of income and poverty
In order to investigate the relationship between parental cir-
cumstances and children’s later economic fortunes, we need data 
that observes children’s family circumstances and then returns to 
see how they are doing later in life. Fortunately we can observe 
these pieces of information in the two British cohort studies: 
the national child development study and the British cohort 
study. The availability of these two sources of data, one a cohort 
born in one week in 1958 and the other a cohort born in a week 
in 1970, allows us to compare the fortunes of those growing up 
in the 1970s with those growing up poor in the 1980s. 
 The interest in the persistence of poverty across genera-
tions stems from a wider concern about the impact of family 
background on economic outcomes. A summary measure of the 
extent to which economic outcomes are related across genera-
tions is known as ‘intergenerational persistence’; it is measured 
as the coefﬁcient on parental income when regressed on chil-
dren’s outcomes, as in Equation 1. Conversely, the degree of 
independence is called ‘intergenerational mobility’, in general a 
low β is seen as indicating substantial mobility. The interpreta-
tion of β is that it tells us the proportion of any income differ-
ence between parents that is passed on to the next generation. 
Equation 1: the relationship between parental and children’s 
incomes 
Table 1 gives estimates of intergenerational persistence in the 
1958 and 1970 cohorts. Here β is calculated from a regression 
of parental income at age sixteen on son’s adult earnings in his 
early 30s, and r is the partial correlation between these two 
variables. For sons born in 1958, the elasticity of own earnings 
with respect to parental income at age sixteen was 0.205; for 
sons born in 1970 the elasticity was 0.291. This is a clear and 
statistically signiﬁcant growth in the relationship between eco-
nomic status across generations. For the correlation estimates, 
the fall in mobility is even more pronounced. The correlation 
for the 1958 cohort is 0.166 compared with 0.286 for the 1970 
cohort.
Table 1: Changes in intergenerational mobility14
1958 cohort 1970 cohort Change
β .205 (.026) .291 (.025) .086 (.036)
Partial Correlation (r) .166 (.021) .286 (.025) .119 (.033)
Sample Size 2163 1976
Source: J Blanden, P Gregg and L Macmillan, Accounting for Intergenerational Income 
Persistence: Non-cognitive skills, ability and education, Centre for the Economics of 
Education Discussion Paper No. 73 (Centre for the Economics of Education, 2006),  
table 4.
These results for intergenerational mobility give the average 
relationship between parental income and later earnings across 
the two cohorts. They provide some evidence that the impact 
of growing up in disadvantage may have increased when com-
paring the two cohorts. However, intergenerational mobility 
results may not give us a correct picture on the transmission of 
poverty because the relationship between parental income and 
later outcomes is different for poor families (non-linearity),  
or because of non-earned income such as beneﬁts and the part-
ner’s income (where there is one). Therefore, it is informative 
to look directly at poverty. 
12 These results are taken 
from J Blanden and S 
Gibbons, The Persistence 
of Poverty: A view from two 
British cohorts (Joseph 
Rowntree, Policy Press, 
2006). 
 
13 This section is drawn from 
J Blanden, Bucking the Trend: 
What enables those who are 
disadvantaged in childhood to 
succeed in later life? Working 
Paper No 31 (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2006). 
14 β and r come from a 
regression of sons’ earnings at 
age 33/30 on parental income 
at age 16. 
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 Our initial estimates of the persistence of poverty are based 
on comparing poverty rates in their early 30s for those who 
grew up in poverty compared with those who did not. 
Of those who were teenagers in the 1970s:
•  for those whose families were poor when they were sixteen,  
19% of those with poor parents are poor and 81% are not. 
Individuals are four times more likely to be non-poor than  
poor in their early 30s. 
•  for those with parents who are not poor, 90% are not poor in 
later life while 10% are poor. In this case, individuals are nine 
times more likely to be non-poor than poor if their parents were 
non-poor. 
Persistence is measured by comparing these two numbers, the 
chances (or odds) of being poor if one’s parents are poor with 
the chances of being poor if they are not (the odds ratio). 
 Calculations of the odds ratio ﬁnd that, for those who were 
teenagers in the 1970s, poverty at sixteen doubled the odds of 
being poor as an adult. Similar calculations for the later cohort 
who were teenagers in the 1980s show that the odds of being 
poor in adulthood were nearly quadrupled by having poor par-
ents (see Figure 1). Comparing these odds across the cohorts 
indicates that the strength of poverty persistence has approxi-
mately doubled, with an increase for men that is slightly greater 
than the rise for women.
Figure 1: How teenage poverty affects the odds of being poor 
as an adult15
Source: J Blanden and S Gibbons, The Persistence of Poverty across Generations (Policy 
Press, 2006), fig. 2.
Suggestive evidence on how poverty is transmitted
These results indicate that child poverty has an association with 
poverty at later ages, and that this association is stronger among 
the 1970 cohort. The important policy question these results 
encourage us to ask is – what is it about growing up in poverty 
that makes it more likely that poor children will experience 
disadvantage in later life? This is crucial in terms of putting in 
place effective policies to alleviate the impacts of early disad-
vantage. For example, if we can show that it is lack of money in 
itself that is causing children to do badly then redistribution is 
an obvious solution, and reducing child poverty through ben-
eﬁts will have important impacts. 
 We know that poor families differ in many ways to those 
who are not poor: they are more likely to be headed by parents 
who have low education, less employment and those who are 
lone parents. Policy prescriptions are more difﬁcult if it is these 
factors that lead to poorer outcomes for children, as they are 
much less subject to change. The datasets used here include 
information on family characteristics, enabling us to measure 
the extent to which they are connected with poverty in later life. 
 To understand the extent to which observable characteris-
tics can account for the transmission of poverty across genera-
tions we can use regression techniques to calculate the odds 
ratios conditional on these variables. That is, we show the  
association between poverty across generations, holding  
parental characteristics constant. 
 Results from this exercise are shown in Figure 2, which 
compares the odds ratios with and without controls for parental 
characteristics. For the teenagers growing up in the 1970s, it 
seems that the impact of these factors on children can explain  
all of the higher poverty rates for children who experienced 
poverty as teenagers. It was their family characteristics, in 
particular, their parents’ poor education and lack of work that 
resulted in their later poverty and not the fact that their par-
ents lacked income per se. For those who were teenagers in the 
1980s this is not the case. Even when taking account of family 
characteristics there is evidence that poverty in itself puts these 
young people at a signiﬁcant disadvantage. 
15 Data from the British 
Cohort Study (BCS) and the 
National Child Development 
Study (NCDS). The bars report 
the odds ratios for poverty 
at sixteen in a logit model 
of poverty at age 33 for the 
earlier cohort and age 30 for 
the later cohort. Vertical scale 
is in logarithms. 
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Figure 2: Intergenerational poverty links controlling for  
parental characteristics16
Source: Based on J Blanden, and S Gibbons, The Persistence of Poverty across 
Generations (Policy Press, 2006), fig. 3.
This result can be taken to imply that straightforward redis-
tribution would have had substantial beneﬁts for the younger 
group. However, this conclusion is too simplistic as it does not 
take account of the ways in which poor and non-poor families 
differ that are difﬁcult to observe. For example, we do not have 
a measure of the parents’ ability to help and encourage their 
children to learn and persevere. In the ﬁnal section of this chap-
ter I present evidence that attempts to exploit the richness of the 
1970 cohort to identify the characteristics that appear to help 
children avoid poverty later in life. 
The characteristics that help children ‘buck the trend’
Our analysis so far has demonstrated a clear link between 
poverty across the lifecycle; however, the majority of children 
who experience child poverty avoid adult poverty at age 30. 
Consequently the idea of ‘bucking the trend’ is somewhat of a 
misnomer, but in this ﬁnal section I compare the characteristics 
of those children in the 1970 cohort who avoid poverty with 
those for whom disadvantage continues in later life. 
 The policy relevance of considering this question is 
extremely clear: identifying the characteristics of those who 
avoid poverty may help government to design policies to help 
children in disadvantage achieve their maximum potential, and 
avoid the cycle of disadvantage identiﬁed above. However, we 
must bear in mind that identifying a link between characteristics 
may not indicate that a policy focused on these characteristics 
would be successful. For example, if we ﬁnd that children do 
better if they are taken to museums, a policy to encourage 
school trips to museums will not necessarily help children if this 
variable is actually a proxy for parents’ overall enthusiasm for 
education. One of the beneﬁts of using the 1970 cohort is the 
richness of the dataset, meaning that not only do we have lots 
of potential candidates for the characteristics that help children 
‘buck the trend’, but also that we can control for the importance 
of other variables, making it less likely that different inﬂuences 
are confounded. 
 In my research I concentrate on those aspects of children’s 
experience that are connected with educational attainment, 
as this is seen by many as a key route through which children 
can escape a poor start in life. Initial results in the ﬁrst panel of 
Table 2 indicate very clearly that children who escape poverty 
are generally those who achieve higher qualiﬁcations. This 
investigation takes the next step, moving beyond the observa-
tion of the result that children who do well at school are more 
likely to ‘buck the trend’ and look more closely at why some chil-
dren manage to do well. 
 Speciﬁcally, I chose to investigate two broad areas: parents’ 
attitudes to learning and the peer group children experience at 
school. To proxy parental attitudes I use the parents’ answers to 
the question, ‘How many times has X been read to in the last 
week?’ in the age ﬁve questionnaire, and the teacher’s report 
of each parent’s interest in the child’s education in the age ten 
questionnaire. Peer group is modelled by the child’s headteach-
er’s responses to questions about the ability and socioeconomic 
mix of the children in the school at age ten. 
 The analysis in the second panel of Table 2 makes it clear 
that considerably more of those children who ‘buck the trend’ 
had parents who took a strong interest in their education and 
who read to them. For example, almost 30% of those who were 
poor at age 30 were not read to during the survey week, com-
16 Data from the British 
Cohort Study (BCS) and the 
National Child Development 
Study (NCDS). The bars report 
the odds ratios for poverty 
at sixteen in a logit model 
of poverty at age 33 for the 
earlier cohort and age 30 for 
the later cohort. Vertical scale 
is in logarithms. The ﬁrst bar in 
each pair is the unconditional 
odds ratio while the second 
bar conditions on lone parent 
family at sixteen, number of 
children in the household, 
parental education, parental 
employment and the 
child’s health. Dotted lines 
surrounding the bar indicate 
an insigniﬁcant relationship.
28   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   29
pared to 15% of those who go on to buck the trend. The results 
from the school analysis indicate that children who bucked 
the trend tend to go to school with a lower proportion of low 
ability children compared to those whose early disadvantage 
persists. The lower panel shows that there is also an association 
between later poverty and going to school with few children 
from higher social backgrounds. The descriptive results, there-
fore, indicate that effective policies to help poor children would 
promote parental engagement and emphasise the importance of 
mixed schooling (i.e. avoiding concentrating poor children in 
schools with high numbers of socially disadvantaged or less able 
students). 
 However, the interpretation drawn from these comparisons 
may be overly simplistic. It could be that these variables are 
simply picking up other differences among children and their 
parents. The apparent importance of reading to children may 
simply be picking up the fact that the more highly educated 
parents are those who tend to read to their children. Similarly, 
the ﬁndings on peer ability may simply be reﬂecting the sorting 
of children into schools; those children who attend schools with 
fewer low ability children are more able themselves and there-
fore more likely to ‘buck the trend’. 
 We can never fully resolve these issues, but using some 
additional variables in multivariate analyses does allow them to 
be investigated. Detailed information on parental education and 
social class can be used to explore whether differences in parents 
behaviour along these dimensions drives the results found so 
far. Children’s ability at ages ﬁve and ten was measured using a 
number of age-appropriate tests. This can help understand the 
relationship between parental interest and the child’s ability, and 
also clarify how children of differing abilities sort into schools.
 The results from the multivariate analysis differ from the 
descriptive ﬁndings in a number of ways. Table 3 reveals that 
there is no evidence that reading to children has a particular 
beneﬁt, as this appears to be a proxy for parental interest in 
education. Indeed, parental interest is very important in helping 
children buck the trend, and shows up in all our models. The 
multivariate results reveal some interesting differences in these 
variables between girls and boys. For boys, father’s interest is 
particularly important in helping them escape disadvantage, 
while for girls, mother’s inﬂuence dominates. For a boy, having 
a father who is very interested in his education rather than one 
with little interest increases the chances of him avoiding poverty 
by 30 percentage points. The negative impact of having a moth-
er with no interest in her daughter’s education is even larger. 
 The other variable found to be important in helping chil-
dren escape poverty is the ability mix of the child’s school. In 
the multivariate analysis (not shown here) it seems that being 
educated with more above-average ability children beneﬁts poor 
boys. There is no impact for girls. It does not appear that the 
effect for boys is picking up the boys’ own ability, as the results 
are not affected when ability is controlled for. However, it is 
possible that unobserved differences remain between boys who 
attend different types of school. 
Concluding remarks
This article has reviewed recent results from several studies of 
the impact of poverty on children’s development and future life 
chances. It is clear that children who grow up in poverty face 
a substantially higher risk of being disadvantaged adults, and 
that this association increased between a cohort growing up in 
the 1970s and one growing up in the 1980s. For the second 
cohort the intergenerational association in poverty cannot be 
accounted for by simple differences between parental education, 
employment and family structure among poor and non-poor 
families. 
 While it is clear that children who grow up in poverty are 
more likely to be poor as adults, this relationship is by no means 
deterministic. Indeed, most children who grow up in poverty 
do not grow up to be poor adults. I have therefore looked for 
those factors in early childhood that may help children avoid 
poverty later on. There is evidence that strong achievement on 
age ﬁve test scores and parental interest in education can help 
children escape the cycle of disadvantage. 
 Although these ﬁndings do not provide governments with 
a ‘quick ﬁx’ to help poor children, there is a suggestion here 
that policies focused on supporting parents and young children 
might have beneﬁts. Recent policies, such as Sure Start, are 
clearly moving in this direction. However, designing policy to 
successfully inﬂuence parenting behaviour is extremely difﬁcult, 
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and it is crucial that interventions such as Sure Start are prop-
erly evaluated to ensure that policy is as effective as possible 
in helping poor children fulﬁl their potential and escape the 
cycle of poverty. The current early evidence from the National 
Evaluation of Sure Start Team17 has not yet been able to identify 
any beneﬁcial effects on children’s test scores, although there 
is some evidence of more supportive and accepting parenting 
from mothers. As the evaluation proceeds and the children age 
we shall be able to see if this translates into more interest in the 
child’s schooling or other positive outcomes that will help poor 
kids to avoid an intergenerational cycle of disadvantage. 
Table 2: Differences between children who “buck the trend” 
and those who do not
Sample is all those poor at 16 where this is defined as if their 
income is below the poverty line in the FES data for 1986. 
Poor at 30 Not poor at 30 Difference (standard 
error)
Education outcomes
Low education at age 16 .447 .289 .157 (.043)
Number of O levels/good CSEs at 16 1.615 3.251 -1.635 (.344)
Highest educational qualification at age 30 (0-8 scale) 2.607 4.076 -1.468 (.189)
Parental interest and reading behaviour
The child was not read to during the survey week (age 
5)
.288 .149 .140 (.033)
Father very interested in child’s education (age 10) .077 .237 -.159 (.034)
Mother very interested in child’s education (age 10) .175 .402 -.227 (.040)
Age 10 peer group
Relatively few low ability children in child’s school 
(<3%)
.138 .200 -.062 (.032)
Relatively many low ability children in child’s school 
(>10%)
.530 .427 .103 (.041)
Relatively few children with professional parents in 
child’s school (<2%)
.335 .267 .068 (.037)
Table 3: Multivariate analysis of characteristics associated with “bucking the trend”
Parental interest and reading behaviour Boys Girls
The child was not read to during the survey week (age 5) -.123 (.073) -.117 (.070)
The child was read to once or twice during the survey week -.092 (.065) .053 (.056)
The child was read to three to six times .002 (.052) .017 (.051)
Father moderate interest in child’s education -.128 (.095) .078 (.071)
Father little interest in child’s education -.317 (.155) -.103 (.133)
Father no interest in child’s education -.152 (.165) -.114 (.090)
Teacher cannot comment on father’s interest -.176 (.086) -.083 (.076)
Mother moderate interest in child’s education -.091 (.060) -.199 (.067)
Mother little interest in child’s education -.032 (.093) -.139 (.109)
Mother no interest in child’s education -.079 (.143) -.576 (.138)
Teacher cannot comment on mother’s interest -.059 (.071) -.163 (.080)
Number of individuals in the sample 530 586
Source: Author’s calculations from British Cohort Study; some numbers also appear in 
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of J Blanden, Bucking the Trend: What enables those who are 
disadvantaged in childhood to succeed in later life?, Working Paper No 31 (Department 
for Work and Pensions, 2006).
17 National Evaluation of Sure 
Start Team, Early Impacts of 
Sure Start Local Programmes 
on Children and Families: 
Research paper no. 13 
(National Evaluation of Sure 
Start, 2005).
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3. Child poverty: avoiding  
a life sentence 
Lisa Harker
The fact that our country has such a high level of child poverty 
often comes as something of a surprise. The UK has a strong 
economy and the highest employment rate among the G8 
member countries. Living standards are good and continue to 
improve. In many ways children’s lives are more enriched than 
ever.
 But changes that took place during the 1980s, when the 
gap between rich and poor rose faster in the UK than in almost 
any other industrialised country, are still reﬂected in the shape of 
our society today. During that period child poverty rates tripled, 
as the incomes of the poorest failed to keep up with the rest of 
society. By the early 1990s one in three children were living in 
relative poverty. Those children who grew up in poverty in the 
1980s are, as Jo Blanden explains in Chapter 2, also more likely 
to be living in poverty today. The pulling apart of society in the 
late twentieth century has left a devastating legacy.
 Child poverty levels have fallen since the mid 1990s, 
largely as a consequence of the government’s determination to 
eradicate child poverty in a generation. The Prime Minister’s 
1999 pledge to end child poverty by 2020 paved the way for 
a series of policy reforms that have substantially improved the 
level of support provided to families with children. As a result 
of changes to the tax and beneﬁt system and the introduction 
of a national minimum wage, the poorest families with children 
are, on average, £3,350 a year better off.18 Welfare to work pro-
grammes have enabled more parents to move into work. The 
impact has been signiﬁcant: the number of children in poverty 
has decreased by 700,000 since 1998. The child poverty rate is 
now at a ﬁfteen-year low and the UK no longer has the highest 
child poverty rate in the European Union.
 But the progress has not been sufﬁcient to reach the gov-
ernment’s interim target to reduce child poverty by 25% by 
2005. Around one in ﬁve children still live in poverty.19 Income 
inequality remains high, driven by high levels of wage and 
wealth inequality. The beneﬁts of our rich society – in the dis-
tribution of income and employment opportunities – are not 
being evenly shared.
 The impact is evident across nearly every indicator of 
health, social and economic wellbeing. Children born into low 
income families are more likely to be of a low birth weight 
(which is itself a health risk), die in the ﬁrst year of life, and 
suffer signiﬁcant episodes of illness.20 They are also more likely 
than their better-off peers to have low educational attainment, 
leave school at sixteen, come into early contact with police, be 
unemployed as young adults, have low expectations for the 
future, and end up earning a relatively low wage.21
 The impact of poverty on a child’s life begins even before 
birth: having an insufﬁcient income can limit a mother’s diet 
during pregnancy, which affects a child’s development. Poverty 
also restricts a family’s ability to participate in everyday activi-
ties, limiting aspirations as well as opportunities. It can mean 
living in an environment so damp or cold that it has an imme-
diate and long-term damaging inﬂuence on children’s health 
and general wellbeing.22 It can result in living in the constant 
shadow of debt. And it can have a detrimental impact on par-
ents’ emotional wellbeing, which, in turn, can affect a child’s 
development: parental depression is strongly linked to children’s 
behavioural problems and low levels of educational attainment.
 Of course, the associations between poverty and children’s 
life chances are in no sense deterministic. Many children who 
grow up in poverty do not experience health, behavioural, 
learning or emotional problems later in life. But the risk of 
damaged life chances is heightened, particularly when poverty  
is experienced in the early years. Indeed, growing up in  
poverty remains one of the most powerful predictors of later  
life chances.
18 This relates to the poorest 
20% of families. 
19 This is calculated by 
measuring the number of 
children living in families on 
incomes below 60% of the 
median. The child poverty 
rate is 19% when using a 
before-housing costs measure 
and 27% when using an after-
housing costs measure. 
 
20 N Spencer, Poverty and 
Child Health (Radcliffe, 2nd 
edition, 2000). 
 
21 P Gregg, S Harkness and 
S Machin, Child Development 
and Family Income (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 1999); 
A McCulloch and H E Joshi , 
Child Development and Family 
Resources: An exploration 
of evidence from the second 
generation of the 1958 British 
birth cohort (Institute for 
Social and Economic Research 
Working Paper, University of 
Essex, 1999); J Bradshaw, 
Poverty: The outcomes for 
children (Family Policy Studies 
Centre, 2001); J Ermisch, F 
Francesconi and D Pevalin, 
Outcomes for Children of 
Poverty: Department for Work 
and Pensions Research Report 
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 The impact of child poverty is devastating in personal 
terms, but it also affects wider society. The costs to society of 
lost opportunities, ill health and unemployment are obvious. 
High levels of child poverty also explain the UK’s comparatively 
poor record on child welfare – the UK has relatively high levels 
of low birth weight babies, infant mortality, poor child health 
and high levels of risky behaviour (teenage pregnancy, drug and 
alcohol misuse) among young people23 compared with other 
European Union countries.
 None of this has escaped the attention of the current gov-
ernment, which has sought to transform support for families 
with children. Its child poverty strategy, as set out in the gov-
ernment’s 2004 Child Poverty Review, has been to improve ﬁnan-
cial support for families, help parents into employment, reform 
public services to enhance children’s life chances, and support 
parents in their parenting role. Increases to tax credits and 
beneﬁts for families have played an important role in tackling 
child poverty. Welfare-to-work programmes have also made a 
difference by helping more parents into employment. There has 
been an increase of eleven percentage points in the lone parent 
employment rate since 1997, for example.
 In the longer term, changes to children’s services through 
the Every Child Matters reforms and development of new serv-
ices, such as Sure Start local programmes and children’s centres, 
are likely to have a signiﬁcant impact on child poverty. Indeed, if 
they are successful in countering disadvantage and breaking the 
generational link between poverty and children’s life chances, 
these reforms will prove to be the most signiﬁcant of all.
 But important as all these changes have been, they will not 
be sufﬁcient to meet the government’s goal to eradicate child 
poverty. On current policies child poverty is not expected to fall 
signiﬁcantly: unless there is further change the government will 
miss its next target of halving child poverty by 2010, and stand 
no chance of eradicating child poverty by 2020.
 Work undertaken for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation24 
has estimated that the 2010 target could be met if a further 
£4.3 billion per annum were invested in beneﬁts and tax credits. 
But an effective anti-poverty strategy must invest in people’s 
capabilities and widen their opportunities, as well as providing 
a better safety net. For many families an income through paid 
employment offers a more effective and sustainable route out of 
poverty. While the government has already placed much empha-
sis on welfare-to-work policies within its strategy to tackle child 
poverty, there are strong grounds for believing that parental 
employment rates could continue to rise beyond current levels. 
Lone parent employment rates are low by European Union 
standards, and while 69% of all couple families where some-
one is work are dual earning, only 24% of poor couples where 
someone is in work are dual earners. The most effective way of 
tackling child poverty is for parental employment rates to rise, 
together with an increase in ﬁnancial support.
 To help more parents into employment changes are nec-
essary,25 however. Welfare-to-work support needs to be more 
attuned to the particular needs of parents, to take account of 
the increasing involvement of fathers in children’s lives, the 
converging aspirations of men and women in the labour market 
and the juggling of work and family commitments, which many 
parents negotiate daily. Welfare-to-work programmes also need 
to move beyond a simple ‘work-ﬁrst’ approach: to thrive in 
today’s rapidly changing labour market parents need guidance, 
support and skills to progress in work. And there will be a need 
to extend the reach of support to help, for example, potential 
second earners in a family to ﬁnd work.
 While such changes could make a signiﬁcant difference 
to child poverty levels, they will not be sufﬁcient to reduce 
child poverty levels in the UK to among the lowest in Europe. 
Despite a substantial increase in ﬁnancial support for families, 
rising levels of employment among parents and new services, 
such as Sure Start, which have all made a difference, we have yet 
to witness the scale of change needed to tackle the intergenera-
tional transmission of disadvantage and poverty.
 What would it take to reduce child poverty radically? Three 
issues immediately present themselves: the need to increase the 
transformative nature of education, to tackle wider inequalities 
in society, and to achieve a public mandate for change.
Closing the education divide
Despite the evidence that educational attainment can help 
children escape a life in poverty, social background remains 
a stronger predictor of achievement in the UK than in many 
23 J Bradshaw, P Hoelscher 
and D Richardson, An Index 
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other countries. Breaking the link between educational achieve-
ment and intergenerational poverty will be key to making long-
term progress on child poverty.
 While the proportion of children achieving ﬁve GCSEs 
at grade A* to C in England has increased by more than ten 
percentage points in the last decade, children from poorer 
backgrounds are still less likely to gain higher grade qualiﬁca-
tions than their better-off peers – a divergence in attainment 
that cannot be explained on the grounds of differing ability. 
This educational divide starts young: research has identiﬁed 
a fourteen percentage point difference in cognitive develop-
ment between children from social classes I and II compared to 
those from social classes IV and V by the age of 22 months.26 It 
points to the need to support parenting and high quality early 
years’ services, which have been shown to beneﬁt particularly 
children from disadvantaged families.27 Encouraging parents’ 
involvement in their children’s learning is also key, since this is 
one of the strongest predictors of a child’s chances of escaping 
poverty.28 Support for pre-school children is improving with the 
roll-out of children’s centres, the expansion in childcare services 
and increased investment in parenting support. But the govern-
ment needs to ensure that there is greater take-up of such sup-
port among the most disadvantaged, who are still least likely to 
beneﬁt from such services, and that the quality of early years’ 
support is sufﬁciently high to make a difference.
 Tackling educational inequalities also requires the posi-
tive impact of pre-school education to be maintained. In recent 
years, while schools with more deprived pupils have gener-
ally seen their average results improve faster than schools with 
less deprived pupils, the attainment of the poorest pupils has 
improved more slowly than their peers.
 The government’s 2004 Child Poverty Review rightly pointed 
to the need to examine the level of funding received by schools 
in disadvantaged areas. Additional funding for such schools 
could be invested in attracting the best teachers and reducing 
class sizes, both would have a particularly beneﬁcial impact on 
disadvantaged pupils. But overall much greater attention needs 
to be paid generally to the policies and practices that can help 
disadvantaged pupils thrive at school, and the Department for 
Education and Skills should set targets to reduce inequalities in 
individual attainment as well as inequalities between advantaged 
and disadvantaged areas.
 Improving education and skills will be critical to ensuring 
that tomorrow’s parents thrive in the labour market. Although 
a parent’s skills and qualiﬁcations are a key determinant of their 
income, and therefore their chances of escaping poverty, the 
government’s child poverty strategy has placed little emphasis 
on skills acquisition to date. However, Lord Leitch’s review of 
skills for government has made a clear case for greater invest-
ment in adult skills to help tackle child poverty.29
 Unless skill levels increase rapidly among those on low 
incomes, progress towards eradicating child poverty will be 
slow. There is expected to be a 25% decline in demand for 
unskilled labour by 2010. While the demand for highly skilled 
workers will continue to outpace the decline in low skilled 
jobs, in an economy where ﬁve million working age adults lack 
any qualiﬁcations it will become increasingly difﬁcult to match 
supply with demand. A generation of workers could ﬁnd them-
selves permanently excluded from the labour market, heighten-
ing their risk of poverty and that of their children. Supporting 
parents to ﬁnd a job will not be sufﬁcient – they also need help 
with gaining skills to ensure that they advance in work.
Tackling wider inequality
With a rising level of median income, driven by fast but unequal 
growth in income, assets and wages, it is not easy to make 
progress on child poverty. Between 1996 and 2001, income ine-
quality rose to its highest level since comparable records began 
in 1961. Income inequality has since fallen back to roughly the 
level that Labour inherited. But it is still less likely now that 
an individual will escape poverty in his or her lifetime than 30 
years ago. Progress on child poverty will be held back unless 
it is possible to share the rewards of the UK’s prosperity more 
equally.
 The government has sought to address some of these 
inequalities by, among other things, improving beneﬁt levels 
for families with children, widening access to savings schemes, 
extending opportunities for home ownership and improving 
wage levels through the introduction of the minimum wage 
and in-work tax credits. These steps to redistribute income and 
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opportunities have had a clear impact on child poverty. But to 
make further progress, much further inroads need to be made 
into tackling income and wealth inequality. Far greater changes 
to the distribution of wealth, earnings and opportunities in 
society are needed – to ensure all are aboard the moving cara-
van, to evoke Polly Toynbee’s much-quoted analogy – in order 
for child poverty to be signiﬁcantly reduced.
 The government has been timid about having an overt 
strategy to reduce inequality, preferring to undertake redistri-
bution by stealth. Yet surveys have found that citizens accept 
inequality based on talent, effort or even luck, but that they also 
believe the ratio of wealth between the poorest and the richest 
should be of the order of around 25 to one. In fact the ratio 
between the top 5000 people in Britain and the poor is more 
like 500 to one.
 Britain’s wage distribution bears little resemblance to the 
widely held notion of fairness. The average total pay for chief 
executives of the FTSE 100 companies increased by more than 
40% in the past year, while wage settlements ran at around 
3%.30 Chief executives in the biggest UK companies now earn 
98 times more than the average of all full-time UK employees 
– whereas twenty years ago the ratio of chief executive pay to 
the average was closer to nine to one. And while this pulling 
away of the richest 1% or so of the population has little direct 
impact on child poverty levels (which are measured against 
median income), it nevertheless threatens to fracture a society 
and undermine a sense of mutual endeavour towards achieving 
a fairer nation. Such inequalities cannot be explained by mar-
ket forces or the exceptional nature of the UK’s top executives. 
Other successful economies do not share our wage distribution. 
A fairer distribution of income, wealth and opportunities is 
within our grasp.
Establishing a public mandate for change
However, in the absence of public support for greater interven-
tion, the government’s options look very constrained indeed.
 Although child poverty is one of the government’s most 
important priorities, and a broader political consensus about the 
importance of reducing child poverty has recently emerged, the 
issue barely registers on the public’s agenda. Nor is there much 
awareness of the progress that has been made to date, or the 
scale of the task that lies ahead. Fewer people believe poverty to 
be a serious problem in Britain today than a decade ago. And 
while the majority of the public thinks that the gap between 
those on high and low incomes is too wide, many people are 
wary of government intervention to tackle poverty and inequal-
ity. Research conducted by the Fabian Society has shown that 
people often attribute poverty to individual failings, such as 
laziness or an inability to parent effectively, rather than simply a 
lack of material resources.31 It will be hard for any government 
to gain support for its child poverty goals simply on the basis of 
sympathy for those who are worst affected.
 Raising awareness about child poverty in the UK is a chal-
lenge that policymakers and campaign groups share. There is 
little doubt that opaque measurement of child poverty fails to 
resonate with the public: it should come as no surprise that the 
need to reduce the number of children living in households on 
incomes below 60% of the median after housing costs has yet to 
become a rallying cry. Such language tends to be alienating. Talk 
of improving ‘social mobility’ or ‘building a progressive consen-
sus’ does not resonate far beyond academe or the Westminster 
village. A more open and inclusive dialogue needs to describe 
the kind of society that we wish to build, if hearts and minds are 
to be won over. And the extent and nature of child poverty in 
Britain will only become clear when it is told in stories that ﬁt 
with people’s own everyday experiences.
 There is also a need to confront misguided attitudes to 
poverty, to demonstrate that while someone living in poverty is 
not absolved of any personal responsibility for their situation, 
discrimination, unequal opportunities and bad luck can also 
play a part. Outdated notions of poverty also need to be chal-
lenged. There remains a tendency to present 21st century child 
poverty in Victorian imagery of rags and starvation. That nearly 
half of children living in poverty now live in a family where 
someone is in work underlines the fact that, for the most part, 
poverty is no longer a question of being destitute but of being 
left behind by a society that is failing to share its riches fairly.
 In presenting these issues to the public there is a need to 
strike a balance between making the self-interest case for tack-
ling child poverty – setting out how a reduction in child poverty 
31 Fabian Society, Narrowing 
the Gap: The ﬁnal report of 
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could beneﬁt society as a whole – and the moral case, which will 
help to bind commitment to tackling child poverty, whatever 
the circumstances. Similarly, the action that government takes 
must chime with the public’s sense of fairness. A strategy that 
fails to encourage people to take some responsibility for their 
destiny is unlikely to attract public support.
 Tackling child poverty remains one of the most important 
missions of our time. It reﬂects not only a desire to transform 
the life chances of a generation of children, but also an ambi-
tion to build a fairer, more equal society. But while policymakers 
debate the respective responsibilities of individuals, employers, 
government and wider society in this endeavour, the public 
appear yet to be convinced of the scale of the problem. In the 
absence of public support for increased action, it will be difﬁcult 
to do more than continue on the current course, which will not 
be sufﬁcient to reduce child poverty signiﬁcantly. Without a 
public mandate for further change, we may already be very near 
the limits of what can be achieved.
4. Access to education and 
basic skills: the first step on 
the ladder of achievement 
Professor Paul Gregg and Lindsey Macmillan
A key measure of an individual’s life chances is the level of inter-
generational income mobility within a country. If mobility is 
low, those who grow up in poor families are more likely to end 
up in poor families as adults. If mobility is high, those from 
poor families have a greater chance of leaving this group and 
earning higher wages in adulthood, and hence have greater life 
chances. This essay discusses recent ﬁndings by Blanden, Gregg 
and Macmillan32 on the interactions that occur that lead family 
background to inﬂuence life chances, with a particular focus on 
the role of skills, education and early labour market attachment 
in determining later outcomes. 
 There have been two main focuses of recent research in 
this area: international comparisons of mobility, and changes in 
mobility within the UK across time. The main ﬁndings of this 
are that the level of mobility in the UK is low by international 
standards,33 and that the extent of mobility in the UK fell when 
considering two British birth cohorts, children born in a week 
in March 1958 and April 1970.34 With the idea that individu-
als’ life chances should not be determined by birth an important 
political notion, it is thus important to try to understand why 
mobility is so low in the UK, and what has led to this decrease 
in mobility across time. 
 Recent research by Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan35 
attempts to account for the key mediating inﬂuences in the 
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strong relationship between family income in childhood and 
adult earnings. The ﬁrst stage of this process attempts to 
account for the low level of mobility in the UK by examining 
the role played by four components – education, cognitive abil-
ity, non-cognitive traits, and labour market attachment – in this 
transmission of parents’ income to adult earnings, using the 
cohort of children born in 1970. The second stage considers the 
changing nature of the relationship between these four com-
ponents, parents’ income and adult earnings, using the 1958 
and 1970 cohorts, in an attempt to account for the decrease in 
mobility across time. 
 The evidence suggests that personal skills, including cogni-
tive ability and non-cognitive traits, education and early labour 
market attachment, can account for over half of the inter-
generational persistence in incomes in the 1970 cohort, with 
inequalities in educational attainment at sixteen, access to fur-
ther education and early labour market attachment playing key 
roles in this. When considering the decrease in mobility across 
time, the ﬁndings suggest that up to 90% of the decrease in 
mobility can be accounted for, with the increase in the relation-
ship of parents’ income with education and early labour market 
attachment accounting for much of the action. Importantly, 
the research suggests there is no substantive role for innate 
ability behind the decline in mobility, but that non-cognitive 
traits, such as ‘application’, self-esteem and personal efﬁcacy, do 
contribute to the decline in mobility. In other words, poor chil-
dren’s education and life chances fell further behind those from 
afﬂuent families, but this was not due to underlying ability. This 
ﬁnding highlights the importance of educational attainment 
at age sixteen, the skills that inﬂuence this attainment, and the 
decisions to pursue education thereafter. It also suggests that 
policymakers should be concerned about the continuing high 
number of NEETs (those not in education, employment or 
training) among Britain’s youth. This group have very poor  
life chances according to research using the birth cohorts,  
discussed later. 
What are the main drivers of low levels of mobility in the UK?
In this research we focus on the role of ﬁve components or 
groupings of variables in describing the patterns of intergenera-
tional mobility we observe. These are cognitive ability before 
age ten, non-cognitive traits before age ten, educational attain-
ment at age sixteen, educational attainment after age sixteen, 
and attachment to the labour market after leaving full-time 
education. To analyse the role each component plays in the 
transmission of parents’ income to earnings, the intergenera-
tional persistence coefﬁcient36 can be decomposed. The larger 
this coefﬁcient, the higher the persistence, or the lower the 
level of mobility.37 For the components in question to account 
for mobility there are two conditions: ﬁrst they must have a 
relationship with family income, and second they must have a 
return in the labour market. Therefore a simple two-stage proc-
ess is used: ﬁrst, by measuring the extent to which a component 
is related to parents’ income, and second, by estimating the 
returns these components will have in the labour market. The 
product of these two measurements reﬂects the extent to which 
a component can account for the level of persistence.
 As the model contains components measured at different 
stages in a child’s life, components that are measured earlier 
in the child’s life may well affect later components. So, for 
example, the individual’s educational attainment at sixteen will 
impact on the level of earnings at 30 obtained directly, but also 
through their early labour market experiences, as those who 
have poor attainment are more likely to experience early detach-
ment from the labour market. Likewise, innate ability will 
undoubtedly impact on educational attainment, and its effect 
on future earnings will, to some degree, come through educa-
tional attainment. Therefore, to explore these sequential effects 
the model is built up in stages over periods of time. The results 
from using the 1970 cohort indicate that all four major com-
ponents considered (cognitive and non-cognitive attainment 
at ages ﬁve and ten, educational attainment and labour market 
attachment) are important in accounting for the high levels of 
intergenerational persistence.
 All of the components in question have signiﬁcant relation-
ships with parents’ income, fulﬁlling the ﬁrst condition for them 
to play a role in accounting for the high levels of persistence. 
When considering the second condition, whether the compo-
nents have a return to earnings, the sequential nature of the 
model tells a number of stories. The role of cognitive ability and 
36 Measured by the 
regression coefﬁcient of son’s 
earnings on parental income 
with controls for parents’ 
age, gender of the child and 
employment status at 30. 
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non-cognitive traits diminishes once the age sixteen educational 
attainments are included, suggesting that both of these child-
hood measurements inﬂuence earnings through education. The 
most strongly affected measure is the child’s application score 
at age ten. Children who are observed with a score substantially 
above the average level of application (a 1 standard deviation 
increase) earn an extra 4.7% as adults, but this is almost entirely 
achieved through higher educational attainment. This suggests 
that children who apply themselves more at the age of ten are 
receiving higher earnings through the achievement of more  
O levels at grades A-C. 
 The estimated additional earnings for one more O level 
(now GCSE grades A-C) at age sixteen are 3.6% at age 30. 
Likewise, with the inclusion of post-sixteen education we 
can see that half these returns to age sixteen attainment come 
through opening access to higher education. When the number 
of A levels achieved, whether the individual stays on post-six-
teen and the achievement of a degree are included, the coef-
ﬁcient for the returns to the number of O levels diminishes 
by a half. The coefﬁcients on the early childhood scores are 
unaffected, suggesting that higher cognitive and non-cognitive 
scores in childhood do not predict the likelihood of staying on 
in education post-sixteen. The additional returns to achieving a 
degree, given the number of O levels and A levels achieved, are 
15% additional earnings at age 30.
 The attachment to the labour market in early adulthood 
also has a large inﬂuence on the earnings of the sons at 30, and 
therefore plays another important role in accounting for the 
high level of intergenerational persistence in the UK. Of the 
quarter of the sample that experience some time in unemploy-
ment, these men can expect to have on average 12% lower 
wages than those who experience no unemployment, and on 
average are unemployed for 10% of the period between the 
completion of full-time education and the age of 30 (around 
nineteen months). Other research suggests this is causal, such 
that youth unemployment damages future earnings rather than 
reﬂecting any other unobserved characteristics of these youths.38
 To consider the whole story of the extent to which each 
component can account for the high level of intergenerational 
persistence, the two conditions are combined and the product 
of the relationship between the components and family income 
and the components and earnings can be considered. The ﬁg-
ures indicate that, with the cognitive and non-cognitive traits 
combined, around 30% of the persistence can be accounted for 
(see Figure 1), with cognitive measures making a more substan-
tive contribution. However, the non-cognitive skills are impor-
tant, especially application, self-esteem and the child’s sense of 
personal efﬁcacy (their sense that their own actions can make 
a difference rather than just fate or luck). With the introduc-
tion of educational attainment at sixteen, describing the role of 
school-based attainment in intergenerational persistence and 
the extent to which cognitive and non-cognitive factors operate 
through education, 40% of the persistence can be accounted 
for, 21% of which is coming directly through attainment at six-
teen. The addition of post-compulsory education takes the total 
of intergenerational persistence accounted for to 46%, and the 
addition of labour market attachment components in the ﬁnal 
speciﬁcation takes the total accounted for to 54%. 
 As can be seen in Figure 1, ﬁnal column, post-sixteen edu-
cational attainment is the single most important factor describ-
ing mobility, accounting for some 20%. But this is capturing 
a large part of the age sixteen educational attainment, as this is 
the gateway to post-sixteen education. Within this ﬁnal speci-
ﬁcation, cognitive and non-cognitive components account for 
only about 6% each; the rest of their impact has come through 
education and labour market attachment. Labour market 
attachment does, in part, reﬂect how non-cognitive skills impact 
on earnings, but cognitive skills are only transmitted through 
education.
38 P Gregg and E Tominey, 
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Figure 1: Decomposition of persistence; 1970 cohort
What lies behind declining mobility?
To consider this question, the second stage compares the 1958 
and 1970 cohorts, using the same methodology, although, due 
to some data restrictions, the measurements of non-cognitive 
traits and educational attainment at age sixteen are slightly dif-
ferent to allow for comparison across time. 
 There are a number of noticeable differences between the 
two cohorts: parents’ income has a weaker association with all 
measures of each component in the earlier of the two cohorts, 
and, in particular, the non-cognitive measures appear to have 
little or no relationship with parents’ income. These compo-
nents have smaller returns to earnings in both cohorts, whereas 
the cognitive components have larger returns to earnings in the 
ﬁrst cohort. This suggests that inherent ability has declined in 
importance in determining child outcomes.39 For the education 
components there has been an increase in the returns to age 
sixteen attainment and degree holdings, but a sharp fall in the 
returns to staying on post-sixteen. The impact of labour market 
attachment on earnings had not changed across time.
 When accounting for the increase in persistence, or fall 
in mobility, the components considered do a good job. While 
persistence had increased by 0.086 points, from 0.205 to 0.291, 
almost 90% of the change has been accounted for (from 0.109 
to 0.184). There are three main factors that account for this 
rise: attainment at age sixteen, through a small increase in the 
returns to education and a much larger increase in the relation-
ship between family income and attainment at sixteen, account-
ing for 34% of the rise; access to higher education has become 
far more strongly related with family income and this accounts 
for 29%; and labour market attachment, where the scar on 
wages has decreased slightly but the relationship with family 
background has increased by a lot, accounting for 19% (see 
Figure 2). Non-cognitive traits are also increasingly important, 
again through the strengthening of the relationship with fam-
ily background, but they operate mainly through educational 
attainment.
 The components considered are successful in providing 
suggestive evidence of how parents with more income  
increasingly see their sons achieve higher earnings. It is  
clear that inequalities in achievements at age sixteen, in  
access to university and early attachment to the labour  
market, are increasingly important in determining the  
level of intergenerational mobility. 
39 This is also found by 
F Galindo-Rueda and A 
Vignoles, ‘The declining 
relative importance of ability 
in predicting educational 
attainment’ (Journal of Human 
Resources, 40(2), 2005), pp. 
335-353. 
Resources need to be directed towards 
improving the conﬁdence, concentration 
and self-efﬁcacy of children from low-
income families from an early age...
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Figure 2: Decomposition of persistence across cohorts; 1958 
and 1970
The role of personal skills, education and early labour market 
attachment
The importance of the role of education in the story of intergen-
erational persistence somewhat overshadows the sizable role of 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills in accounting for this persist-
ence. These variables both work indirectly through inﬂuencing 
the level of education obtained, but are nonetheless important 
directly as well. The strengthening of the relationship between 
family income and behavioural traits that inhibit children’s 
educational attainment is one of the clear paths through which 
this occurs. However, cognitive ability offers no substantive 
contribution to changes in mobility; implying that genetically 
transmitted intelligence is unlikely to be a substantive driver. 
This evidence contrasts work by Hernstein and Murray in The 
Bell Curve,40 which suggests that social stratiﬁcation based on 
ability has been increasing in the twentieth century. The impor-
tance of the role of non-cognitive behaviour in later educational 
and labour market decisions has also been noted by Heckman, 
Stixrud and Urzua.41 Their ﬁndings suggest that, in the US, 
schooling decisions and levels of wages given schooling  
decisions are strongly inﬂuenced by non-cognitive skills. They 
also ﬁnd that ‘schooling, employment, work experience and 
choice of occupation are affected by latent non-cognitive and 
cognitive skills.’
 This evidence suggests that in order to raise mobility, pro-
grammes need to be developed that expand not only cognitive 
skills but also non-cognitive traits, such as self esteem, concen-
tration and the child’s perception of how much their lives can 
be inﬂuenced by their own decisions rather than chance. The 
strengthening of the relationship between these traits and fam-
ily background suggests the need for resources to be directed 
towards those from deprived backgrounds. 
 This can be done either by directing resources exclusively 
at poorer schools or communities, or by universal interventions 
that are more effective for poor children, for example, high 
quality pre-school childcare42 and the UK literacy hour.43 High 
quality early years childcare and parenting are important in 
increasing the skills of children. The ten-year childcare strategy 
and Sure Start may help here, as will reducing child poverty. But 
more needs to be done in schools. 
40 R J Hernstein and C 
Murray, The Bell Curve: 
Intelligence and class 
structure in American life (New 
York: Free Press, 1994). 
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paper no. 12006 (NBER, 
2006). 
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43 S Machin and S McNally, 
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 The government funding for education gives more resourc-
es to local education authorities (LEAs) serving poor communi-
ties, but this extra money is usually spread across all schools in 
the LEA rather than those teaching the most deprived children, 
and within school all too often extra resources are spread gen-
erally rather than targeted. The government is beginning to 
introduce more focused strategies. Early reading pilot schemes, 
the Early Reading Development Pilots, have been expanded in 
the pre-Budget report to include an additional 32 LEAs after 
initial results from the pilots suggested encouraging improve-
ments in children’s reading abilities. In addition to reading, the 
new pilots will also focus on speaking, listening and children’s 
language development. Under Teach First, the best graduates 
are incentivised to teach in deprived schools, and this scheme is 
also to be expanded from the current application in London and 
Manchester. These small steps need to be part of a much larger 
direction of resources to support deprived children. The direct 
cash payment to schools from the Department for Education 
and Skills (DfES) should vary according to the extent of dep-
rivation the school intake faces. Schools could also do more 
to promote home learning for disadvantaged children, as with 
Sure Start and Book Start. 
 In addition to the funding directly to schools and to pro-
grammes to help deprived areas, an emphasis needs to be placed 
on changing access to schooling. Currently, access to schools 
is largely based on a catchment area system, although there are 
margins of variation through faith schools, grammar schools 
in some areas, and other partial selection criteria. It has been 
shown by our research centre44 how dramatically this creates 
sorting of children into schools by family income and race. 
Even when living near each other, the poorer child is found to 
go to a lower quality school than the richer child, and the poor 
child rarely gets into a good school, even when it is the nearest 
school. Fair access to good schools ought to be a key govern-
ment priority. This could be achieved through greater parental 
choice, as long as the oversubscribed school cannot choose its 
preferred pupils, which suggests a lottery or clearing system as 
used by universities. There is also a need for an effective out-
reach and support for poorer families to make informed choices 
and enable access to good schools when they are not close by 
(e.g. school buses). 
 The returns to education appear to have increased up to the 
mid-1990s, but recent research suggests this process has now 
stopped.45 Recent Labour Force Survey data suggests that the 
earnings gain from getting a degree, as opposed to no quali-
ﬁcations, is around 50%. But the key important aspect in the 
story of post-sixteen education is the increase in the strength of 
the relationship between family income and higher education. 
The growing imbalance in access to higher education by fam-
ily background as higher education expanded has been noted 
in a number of other papers. Blanden and Machin46 use three 
cohorts to consider the change in the participation in higher 
education across time. They ﬁnd, despite the fact that children 
from high income families were participating to the greatest 
extent in higher education before the expansion in the early 
1990s, a disproportionate number of high income children 
entered higher education after the expansion, effectively widen-
ing the participation gaps between high and low income chil-
dren. This supports the ﬁndings in the increase in the relation-
ship with family background and suggests powerful evidence 
that this imbalance is partly driving the decline in intergenera-
tional mobility in the UK.
Figure 3: The proportion of young people (aged 16-19) not in 
employment, full-time education or training across time
Source: Family Expenditure Survey (Office for National Statistics, 1969-2003). 
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Policy interventions that could, therefore, enable those from 
low income families to stay on at school and achieve higher 
education could lead to an increase in mobility. The number 
of sixteen to nineteen year olds in the UK who are classiﬁed as 
NEETs (not in employment, education or training) rose sharply 
through the early 1980s recession, peaking in 1985, with a 
smaller peak after the early 1990s in 1993, and then fell sharply 
with rising employment and education participation (see Figure 
3). Since 1997, according to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
the proportion of sixteen to nineteen year olds NEETs has 
increased slightly, from 11.5% to 12.1% by 2006. As can be 
seen from Figure 4, those from the lowest social classes are far 
more likely to fall into this category than those from the highest 
social classes. 
 There is still a strong relationship between family back-
ground, education and early labour market attachment. A 
report by the DfES found that the pilot schemes of educational 
maintenance allowances (EMAs) had little effect on drawing 
back young people who entered the NEET group at the end 
of compulsory school education, and those in receipt of EMA 
tended to be better qualiﬁed on entry to college. Therefore 
EMA may encourage poorer children with qualiﬁcations to 
stay on in education, but it is not tackling the problem of those 
who are disengaged from an early age. Evidence from the LFS 
suggests that, of those who were NEETs in 2006, 30% had 
achieved no qualiﬁcations and 37% had left school after their 
GCSEs. The bulk of NEETs, some 58%, are currently unem-
ployed (though many are not on job seeker’s allowance, as 
many will be ineligible), suggesting around 8% of the overall 
age group are unemployed. Of the remaining NEETs, 11% 
were sick or disabled and 13% were looking after the home, 
mostly with children.
Figure 4: Decomposition of activities young people (aged 16-
19) are participating in, by social class of the head of the 
family for 2006
Source: Labour Force Survey (Office for National Statistics, 2006).
Gregg and Tominey47 found that unemployment in youth in the 
early 1980s caused a wage scar on individuals, even at the age of 
42, of between 12% and 15%. If the individuals avoid repeated 
occurrences of unemployment, the wage scar is still around 
8-10%. Their research suggests that this wage scar was caused 
directly by their unemployment rather than by unobserved 
characteristics of these individuals. Hence NEETs can expect to 
have near-lifelong wage and employment scars. Young men’s 
early labour market attachment across the two birth cohorts 
(1958 and 1970) saw a strong increase in the relationship with 
family background. This means that there has been an increas-
ing concentration of those experiencing unemployment among 
low income families, and is hence associated with reduced inter-
generational mobility. 
 The stubborn resistance of the numbers of youths not in 
education or employment requires addressing. There are two 
approaches that could be taken, which need not be alternatives. 
First, since the last Conservative government ended the entitle-
ment of sixteen and seventeen year olds to unemployment ben-
47 Op.cit., ref. 38. 
54   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   55
eﬁts, there has been no contact mechanism with these individu-
als if they choose to leave education. The Labour government 
created EMAs, payments for young people from poor families 
who stay on in education, and tax credits, likewise, are available 
for those in education. However, this has mainly resulted in 
a switch to education from young people who would alterna-
tively have entered into employment (usually without training), 
rather than reducing the group of NEETs. One problem is mak-
ing contact with the NEETs to bring them back in to work or 
education; those who leave the system at sixteen can be unheard 
of for two years and contact is only re-established if they claim 
unemployment beneﬁt when they reach eighteen. Unlike the 
welfare-to-work programmes for other groups, there is no ben-
eﬁt link to incentivise contact and participation. So an effective 
policy would be to create an activity-related beneﬁt for sixteen 
to seventeen year olds whereby young people receive a payment 
when meeting the conditions of studying (already available 
under EMA), training or undertaking a preparatory stage. This 
last element would cover waiting for a programme to start, 
basic skills training, work trials etc., and would be an indi-
vidualised support package designed by a personalised adviser. 
Payments would be conditional on fulﬁlling the agreement. This 
voluntary approach would also reduce the bias towards full-time 
education over employment with training that exists for EMAs. 
The other alternative is a compulsory approach, raising the 
school leaving age to eighteen but including workplace employ-
ment with training (e.g. the Train to Gain programme) within 
the system of fourteen to nineteen education. This proposal 
would also make a contribution to equalising children’s life 
chances.
 The expansion of university education has beneﬁted chil-
dren from the most afﬂuent 50% of families, with very little 
impact on the poorest. But the bulk of this gap in participation 
stems from earlier educational disadvantage that builds through 
children’s school years. This increasing attainment gap is not 
due to a widening gap in innate ability but, rather, increasing 
differences in family resources, part of which are used to get 
children into the best schools. 
 The most effective way to improve intergenerational 
mobility is to expand educational opportunities of the deprived, 
which, as well as its direct effects, will also raise the supply 
of skills and, in turn, reduce the wage mark-up for education 
qualiﬁcations (reducing wage inequalities, and hence differences 
in life chances). Measures to improve participation beyond age 
sixteen are also important to aiding this process. Current plans 
to offer help with funding at HE level to those who complete a 
40-week voluntary service, and new ‘earn to learn’ packages that 
offer support to those who study for HE qualiﬁcations part-
time and work part-time, could prove beneﬁcial in increasing 
the number of participants in HE from low-income families.  
In addition, the fact that there is now a grant offered to those 
from low-income families who attend HE institutions is a step 
in the right direction, but the low level of this grant and the 
complexity of bursary systems run by each university separately 
need to be addressed to open the system to those from poorer 
backgrounds.
Conclusion
To conclude, the level of social mobility in the UK is lower 
than in most other countries and decreased towards the end of 
the last century. In order to address this trend, it is important 
to understand the components that account for this reduction 
in life chances. The evidence suggests that there are three key 
components inﬂuencing this downturn in mobility: educational 
attainment at sixteen; access to higher education; and early 
labour market experiences. Underlying these three components 
is the role played by personal skills in early to mid-childhood, 
which, through non-cognitive traits (application, self-esteem 
and a sense of personal efﬁcacy) becoming more strongly related 
to family background, are playing a more important role in pre-
dicting life chances in the later cohort. 
 With this in mind, there are a number of areas where 
policy needs to become more focused. To tackle the issue of 
the increasing relationship between family background and 
non-cognitive traits, resources need to be directed towards 
improving the conﬁdence, concentration and self-efﬁcacy of 
children from low-income families from an early age through 
higher quality childcare and pre-school programmes. Tackling 
child poverty may well have major beneﬁts in this area. Better 
funding for deprived schools, fairer access policies to schools, 
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and increased funding to schemes like ‘teach ﬁrst’ would allow 
poorer children greater access to better quality education and 
better quality teachers. This would improve the educational 
attainment of low-income children and increase mobility in 
two ways: by reducing the relationship between attainment and 
family background; and by widening the supply of more quali-
ﬁed individuals, and hence diminishing the returns to educa-
tion witnessed at present. In addition, as the number of NEETs 
continues to be a problem, increasing the compulsory school 
leaving age to eighteen and/or introducing an activity-related 
beneﬁt for sixteen and seventeen year olds would create a con-
tact mechanism with those who are currently out of reach to 
reduce the impact of wage scarring on them in later life. Policies 
aimed at encouraging participation from low-income children 
in HE, such as fee reductions for voluntary work and more ﬂex-
ible part-time options, will also increase mobility by increasing 
access to higher education, therefore reducing the returns to 
education and the relationship between family background and 
further attainment. 
5. Harnessing the aspirations 
of sick and disabled people: 




The title of this collection is The Politics of Aspiration. It is a title 
that immediately attracted me when I was invited to contribute 
an essay based on many years’ experience of research on welfare-
to-work programmes aimed at helping sick and disabled people 
enter employment. The attraction was that word aspiration, 
because from the work that I and many colleagues have done it 
has consistently emerged as central to helping people into work. 
I do not think it is too much of a simpliﬁcation to say that 
without aspiration to move towards work, progress is highly 
unlikely. The positive thing about aspiration is that it can be 
harnessed if it is there from the start, but it can also be instilled 
and nurtured if it isn’t. The other side of the coin, though, is 
that aspiration can be a delicate thing, easily damaged or, worse, 
destroyed.
 So, in this essay I want to look at what happens to people 
out of work because of a health or disabling condition when 
their aspirations (or lack of) come into contact with govern-
ment social security and employment policies. In doing so I 
will be starting an unﬁnished story that started in 1997 with the 
New Labour government’s Green Paper, New Ambitions for Our 
Country: A new contract for welfare,48 reaching its latest instalment 
48 Department of Social 
Security, New Ambitions for 
Our Country: A new contract 
for welfare (TSO, 1998). 
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in 2006 with A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering people to work,49 
a document that has formed the basis of the 2006 Welfare 
Reform Bill, which is due to become law in 2007. 
 I will start with an overview of welfare-to-work policies 
for sick and disabled people since 1997. This will identify one 
major piece of unﬁnished business – reform of incapacity beneﬁt 
– that is part of the Welfare Reform Bill mentioned above. The 
third section therefore looks at the replacement for incapacity 
beneﬁt, the employment and support allowance, that links to 
section four, which offers a long-term vision of how this might 
lead to more radical beneﬁt reform.
Welfare to work, sickness and disability 
One of the most pressing social policy issues facing the Labour 
government in 1997 was the seemingly unstoppable rise in the 
number of people receiving long-term incapacity beneﬁt. The 
reasons for this rise were reasonably well understood. Large 
numbers of new claimants were generated by the closure of 
mines and heavy industry in the 1980s and 1990s, claimants 
were encouraged to claim sickness-related beneﬁts rather than 
unemployment beneﬁts, and, importantly, far more claimants 
were coming on to beneﬁts than were leaving, creating a large 
‘stock’ of long-term recipients with no recent experience of the 
labour market. 
 The government’s response was to create the New Deal 
for Disabled People (NDDP) in 1998. The core idea of NDDP 
was to offer to people in receipt of incapacity beneﬁt for six 
months or more individual, customised help, from a designated 
‘personal adviser’ whose job it was to ascertain a person’s aspi-
rations, assess their capabilities, identify barriers to work and 
put into action a plan intended to get that person a sustainable 
paid job. This model of delivery based on a personal adviser 
borrowed heavily from the New Deals for young people and 
for lone parents. The personal advisers were intended to be 
entrepreneurial in their approach. They could mobilise existing 
resources already available through Jobcentre Plus, and had a 
pot of money that they could use creatively at their discretion  
to address any particular needs (for example, for clothing, tools 
or fares). 
 Unfortunately, although many individuals beneﬁted greatly 
from involvement with NDDP, the numbers of people taking 
it up were disappointing. Part of the problem was thought to 
reside in the scheme’s voluntary nature. The NDDP provider 
organisations could only publicise their services and wait for 
responses. Not enough people did, and new policy thinking was 
required.
 The next big step forward came in 2002 with the publica-
tion of the policy document Pathways to Work: Helping people into 
employment.50 At the outset, the thinking behind Pathways attract-
ed (cautious) support from a wide range of sources, including 
the disability lobby. One of the good things about the Pathways 
approach was that it seemed to reﬂect lessons learned over the 
previous ﬁve years. The architecture of the Pathways to Work 
scheme reﬂected most (not quite all) of these lessons. In its ini-
tial manifestation (it has evolved since) Pathways contained the 
following elements: 
•  a new breed of personal adviser, selected and specially trained 
to be able to work with incapacity beneﬁt recipients expected to 
present a wide range of health and other barriers to work
•  a focus on new claimants of incapacity beneﬁt, not those who 
had been in receipt for long periods
•  a new service – the condition management programme – 
designed to provide support and advice, through partnership with 
the NHS, to help people understand their conditions and their 
capabilities better
•  a new ﬁnancial incentive – the return to work credit – of £40 a 
week for a year for people commencing work of sixteen hours a 
week or more
•  access to the full range of services already available through 
Jobcentre Plus, including NDDP, Access to Work, training oppor-
tunities (and much more)
•  a regime of six compulsory work-focused interviews with a  
personal adviser.
Pathways to Work started out as a pilot scheme in seven areas of 
the country in 2004, but decisions were soon taken to make it 
bigger, based on early administrative information that showed 
that incapacity beneﬁt claimants in the pilot areas were coming 
off beneﬁt at a rate some eight percentage points more than 
non-pilot areas. Ministers were delighted. Nothing tried previ-
49 Department for Work and 
Pensions, A New Deal for 
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50 Department for Work 
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ously could match this order of impact. At the time of writing, 
Pathways has been expanded to fourteen further areas and to 
some longer-term recipients (those on beneﬁt for between one 
and three years), and the scheme will begin to go nationwide 
in 2007. Furthermore, conﬁrmation of the early administra-
tive data has been provided from a survey of incapacity beneﬁt 
claimants carried out as part of the Pathways evaluation. The 
Pathways policy increased the percentage of people working (at 
around ten months after ﬁrst contacting a local Jobcentre Plus 
ofﬁce) by an estimated nine percentage points.51 
 So, why is Pathways having the level of impact it is so far? 
The answers to this question are beginning to emerge from the 
large programme of evaluation research that has been going 
on since Pathways began. For the purposes of this essay, I will 
concentrate very brieﬂy on two related topics – the personal 
adviser-claimant relationship, and the compulsory regime of 
work-focused interviews. I have selected these because they are 
relevant to the theme of aspiration and to government plans to 
reform incapacity beneﬁt. 
 When incapacity beneﬁt personal advisers were interviewed 
as part of the evaluation research they were able to discuss 
a number of factors that were inﬂuential in moving people 
forwards towards work. The research report52 highlighted 
the importance the advisers put in the personal relationship 
between themselves and their clients and the need to establish 
a ‘positive trusting relationship’ that might only come after a 
number of interviews with them. One adviser was quoted as 
saying: ‘You’ve got to get the trust from them and then they’ll 
open up to you and discuss any issues they’ve got with you… 
You’ve got to do it over a period of time.’53 
 This view of the importance of the adviser-client relation-
ship is echoed in research with Pathways clients.54 Among some 
social security recipients there is a widespread distrust of the 
Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus. Many 
people view the beneﬁt authorities suspiciously, more concerned 
to reduce or stop beneﬁt than to help them. People on incapac-
ity beneﬁt, in particular, fear that a willingness on their part to 
discuss a possible return to work will be taken as evidence that 
they no longer qualify for incapacity beneﬁt. People generally 
need to be convinced that personal advisers are ‘on their side’ 
and not there to police their beneﬁt. This relationship of trust 
is sometimes hard won, and personal advisers are reluctant to 
jeopardise it. One feature of Pathways that helps foster trust is 
the voluntary nature of any involvement with anything other 
than the work-focused interviews. No one is obliged to take up 
any of the opportunities, such as the condition management 
programme or NDDP, if they do not want to. 
 The role of the personal adviser is, therefore, what has been 
described as an ‘enabler’.55 Personal advisers do have a contrast-
ing ‘enforcer’ role in connection with the work-focused inter-
views. As mentioned above, attendance at these is compulsory 
and failure to attend can lead to beneﬁt being suspended. This 
compulsion to attend interviews was a cause of concern to some 
disability organisations when Pathways began, but in practice 
has proved largely unproblematic for personal advisers and cli-
ents alike. Hence, personal advisers have been able to balance 
their enabler/enforcer roles in a way that also allows a trusting 
relationship to develop. One might call the level of compulsion 
within Pathways to Work as ‘light touch’. There is only compul-
sion to talk to a personal adviser, which for most people is nei-
ther a problem nor an imposition. 
 What has emerged from the research with personal advis-
ers and Pathways clients is that, as minister after minister has 
repeated, many people on incapacity beneﬁts have aspirations 
to return to work. The strength of Pathways so far appears to be 
that, in practice, it is working with the grain of people’s aspira-
tions, helping them identify work goals and enabling them to 
achieve those goals at a pace that they determine, rather than is 
forced upon them.
 Having said that, the barriers to work posed by the beneﬁt 
system, identiﬁed before Pathways but not addressed by the 
Pathways scheme, have remained. Remained, that is, until the 
announcements of the government’s plan to replace incapacity 
beneﬁt with a new beneﬁt. The next part of the essay turns its 
focus, therefore, on to the imminent arrival of the employment 
and support allowance.
Reforming incapacity benefit 
The reform of incapacity beneﬁt, currently part of the Welfare 
Reform Bill, is probably well overdue. In an article written for 
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the Disability Rights Bulletin in 2006, I summarised what I saw as 
the problems with the beneﬁt.
As a means for providing a secure and adequate income for people who 
cannot work the current hotch-potch of piecemeal and overlapping bene-
ﬁts doesn’t actually perform very well. And as an active rather than pas-
sive system, supporting people who want to move towards and into work, 
it struggles to perform at all.56
This is by no means a maverick thought. In introducing its 
plans for reform in the green paper, A New Deal For Welfare,57 
the government listed ‘fundamental problems’ with incapacity 
beneﬁt. One of these was the ‘perverse incentive’ for people to 
stay on incapacity beneﬁt rather than seek a route off it and into 
work. This perverse incentive works in a number of ways, for 
example, by paying more money to longer-term recipients, and 
by introducing the possibility of people losing their beneﬁt if 
they even try to return to work. 
 There are other problems with the beneﬁt also. The medi-
cal test (called the personal capability assessment, or PCA) is 
perceived to be arbitrary and difﬁcult to administer. It is badly 
suited to people with mental health conditions or ﬂuctuating 
conditions. As a result of ‘passing’ or ‘failing’ the PCA people 
are obliged to move back and forth between incapacity beneﬁt 
and job seeker’s allowance. One consequence of this is that 
someone receiving some form of help on the basis of being an 
incapacity beneﬁt recipient can have that help removed. People 
are afraid to try work on a temporary or trial basis because they 
fear they will lose their incapacity beneﬁt. 
 The proposed replacement for incapacity beneﬁt is called 
the employment and support allowance. It is planned to be 
implemented in 2008. In essence the ESA is structured into 
three elements. New claimants will be paid a ‘holding rate’ (at 
the same level as JSA) until they have been assessed under a 
revised personal capability assessment. The new PCA will dis-
tinguish between those claimants who will receive a higher rate 
payment and not be required to satisfy any work-related require-
ments as a condition of receipt, and those who have less serious 
health or disabling conditions who will be required to draw up 
an action plan of work-related activities, for which they will be 
paid a lower rate. Sanctions will be applicable to claimants fail-
ing to comply with their action plan. 
 Unsurprisingly, the proposals for ESA attracted some criti-
cism and concern. From a personal perspective, when I read the 
green paper in January 2006 I was also puzzled at the propos-
als for ESA because they did not seem to address the problems 
with incapacity beneﬁt that the government had itself identiﬁed 
and had also emerged from research on incapacity beneﬁt and 
Pathways to Work over a number of years. How, I thought, 
would ESA solve the problem of people with ﬂuctuating con-
ditions and the problem of moving between JSA and the new 
beneﬁt? And wouldn’t a ‘perverse incentive’ still operate because 
a higher rate of beneﬁt would be paid to the most sick and  
disabled claimants? And wouldn’t people still be worried that 
any attempts to move towards work would result in a loss of 
beneﬁt? 
 In some ways, therefore, the ESA proposals seemed like a 
missed opportunity for more radical reform that would trans-
form incapacity beneﬁt into a much more active beneﬁt that 
supported welfare-to-work policies rather than perpetuated 
the constraining features of incapacity beneﬁt. However, a very 
short chapter in the green paper seemed to suggest that ESA 
was not the end of the story but that longer-term reform was 
very much part of the government’s thinking. 
 So having reached the end of the story so far, the next sec-
tion takes a tentative look into the future at what that longer-
term reform could produce.
A look into the future – a single ‘working age benefit’?
The one sentence in the green paper that grabbed my attention 
was this:
We consider that there may be advantages in moving in the longer term 
towards a single system of beneﬁts for all people of working age, with 
appropriate additions for those who have caring responsibilities and those 
with a long-term illness or disability.58 
Questions were immediately prompted. Could a single ‘work-
ing age beneﬁt’ be designed that would be appropriate for all 
working age claimants, whether they are simply unemployed or 
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lone parents or disabled people? What might it look like? Could 
it ﬁt with welfare-to-work policies and support people’s moves 
into work rather than hinder them? Elsewhere59 I have attempt-
ed to answer these questions, but in the space available here I 
will summarise the main points. First, I suggest that a ‘working 
age beneﬁt’ could be based on three principles:
•  a single set of rules
•  beneﬁt paid at a standard basic rate (with additions based on 
deﬁned circumstances) 
•  beneﬁt remains the same over time (i.e. no higher, long-term 
rates).
Such a beneﬁt would be easier to understand and to administer 
than either incapacity beneﬁt or ESA. The problems created by 
moving between job seeker’s allowance and incapacity beneﬁt 
would disappear and there would be no risk to beneﬁt of trying 
work, as the beneﬁt would be the same before and after a period 
in work. The stigma, and resultant discrimination, sometimes 
associated with the name ‘incapacity beneﬁt’ might be avoided. 
And there would be no ‘incentives’ for claiming one beneﬁt 
over another. The next question to address was the level of con-
ditionality that should be attached to a ‘working age beneﬁt’ 
– what should the responsibilities of claimants be? 
 Supposing eligibility was based on the answers a claimant 
gave to what I have called two ‘gateway questions’:
•  Do you think you will be capable of paid work at any time  
in the future?
•  Do you want to work at any time in the future?
The evidence suggests that most people would answer yes to 
both. This could be the basis of a Jobcentre Plus personal advis-
er and a claimant working together to achieve the same thing, 
work in the future, concentrating on the adviser’s ‘enabler’ 
role. Threats about sanctions would be irrelevant. The adviser-
claimant relationship would be based on the aspirations of the 
individual, not on a preconception of what he or she ought 
to do. This approach is potentially highly inclusive and non-
discriminatory. No one need be labelled as ‘a lone parent’ or 
‘disabled person’ or anything else. Clearly some criteria would 
need to be established whereby a ‘no’ to either question would 
not necessarily exclude a person from receiving the working age 
beneﬁt. There are circumstances relating to health or disability 
for which a no to the ﬁrst question would be entirely legitimate. 
The current incapacity beneﬁt PCA and proposed revised PCA 
under the ESA perform a similar function to what would be 
needed for a working age beneﬁt. The attraction of the ‘gate-
way’ questions is that they reﬂect most people’s aspirations to 
work rather than being based on a presumption that conditions 
and sanctions are necessary to move people towards work. 
 These ideas are, appropriately for this volume, at the level 
of aspiration rather than detail. To turn aspiration into practical 
policy would require a number of tricky issues to be addressed, 
such as the level of beneﬁts, whether eligibility should be linked 
to national insurance contributions or means tested, and what 
additions (for example for disability or caring responsibilities, 
or to reﬂect the additional costs of disability) should be avail-
able. The question to be answered at this stage is whether the 
potential advantages of a working age beneﬁt over both inca-
pacity beneﬁt and ESA justiﬁes time and effort to address the 
tricky issues.
Conclusion 
This has been an opportune time to look at welfare reform and 
disabled people. The government is currently taking stock after 
nearly ten years of quite intensive policy change, which not only 
includes the types of welfare-to-work policies I have been dis-
cussing in this essay but also the introduction of the minimum 
wage, tax credits, and the implementation and development 
of the Disability Discrimination Act. The major changes in 
welfare-to-work and disability beneﬁts have been mirrored in 
pensions policy, child support and housing beneﬁt. This is not 
to suggest that the government is complacent about what it has 
achieved to date. It has set itself ambitious targets for the eradi-
cation of child poverty by 2020, an overall employment rate 
of 80% of the population, and the reduction in the number of 
people on incapacity beneﬁts by one million, all of which look 
highly daunting as I write in late 2006. 
 Looking across the brief of the Department for Work and 
Pensions, therefore, it is clear why it is taking stock now and 
why the Secretary of State, John Hutton, announced on 18 
59 Op.cit., ref. 56, pp.3-5. 
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December 2006 ‘a long-term review of the government’s wel-
fare to work strategy to tackle economic inactivity and promote 
social mobility’.60 It is a pity, therefore, that long-term beneﬁt 
reform (subsequent to the introduction of ESA in 2008) has 
seemingly already been judged a non-starter. Referring to the 
same sentence from the green paper that I have cited above  
and which encouraged my long-term thinking, the Secretary  
of State told the Select Committee on Work and Pensions on  
6 March 2006:
We are not talking about there simply being one working-age ben-
eﬁt. Some people have looked at this part of the Green Paper and have 
assumed that there will only be one working age beneﬁt; that is not what 
I think is likely to come out of this… The Employment and Support 
Allowance is a long-term reform of Incapacity Beneﬁt and provides a 
much more straightforward, streamlined, simpler form of supporting peo-
ple on Incapacity Beneﬁt.61
Not many commentators have endorsed this view of ESA 
as ‘more straightforward, streamlined [and] simpler’, so it is 
hopefully not too late to persuade policymakers that long-term 
beneﬁt reform is not only achievable but actually necessary to 
support the aims of helping more people on incapacity beneﬁts 
into work. As I have documented above, the Pathways to Work 
approach has produced not only an increase in people coming 
off incapacity beneﬁt and into work, but also a depth of under-
standing about how Pathways gets results. Building a trusting, 
mutually co-operative relationship that allows aspirations to 
be nurtured and realised is an essential element when Pathways 
works well. Much has been achieved, but as always, there is still 
more to be done. Space has prevented me tackling the role of 
employers and the impact of labour markets on the employment 
prospects of incapacity beneﬁt recipients, and these are clearly 
highly important issues.
 Jim Murphy, Minister for Employment and Welfare 
Reform, speaking in the Committee stage of the Welfare 
Reform Bill in October 2006, referred to the ‘overwhelm-
ing aspiration of those on incapacity beneﬁt’ of whom ‘nine 
out of ten… say that they wish for the opportunity to work.’ 
Harnessing that aspiration should ideally be at the heart of not 
only employment policies like Pathways to Work, but also social 
security policy. It would be a highly retrograde step if imminent 
incapacity beneﬁt reform should stiﬂe aspiration by jeopardising 
the relationship between advisers and claimants when there is 
the opportunity of strengthening it by creative long-term think-
ing about further beneﬁt reform.
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6. Cultures, belief and 
aspiration 
Trevor Phillips 
The new government in 1997 opened up the prospect of a 
change for Britain – a new focus on the betterment of society’s 
disadvantaged. This government has aimed to secure a standard 
of living for all citizens commensurate with the dignity and 
worth of each human being. It is increasingly evident, however, 
that aspects of identity distinct from social class have had, and 
continue to have, signiﬁcant implications for people’s life chanc-
es and their risk of experiencing poverty. It is also apparent that 
this matters more and more.
 A number of the policies introduced since 1997 have made 
an important contribution to realising the Labour government’s 
early ambitions. The UK now has the fourth highest employ-
ment rate in the EU. The national minimum wage, introduced 
in 1999, has boosted the pay of low-paid workers. The New 
Deal programmes have provided a mix of employment incen-
tives to particular client groups and employers. While it is 
impossible to attribute the increased labour market participa-
tion of particular groups solely to the New Deal,62 since 1997 
employment rates have gone up across all those groups that 
were targeted by these programmes.63 More than 500 Sure Start 
programmes are up and running in some of the most deprived 
areas of the country, designed to improve the life chances of 
children by improving their health and social development and 
ensuring that they are ready to learn when they get to school.
 This government can point to many important accomplish-
ments and, since 1997, has reduced the numbers of people liv-
ing in poverty. However, it is also faced with the stark fact that 
the gap between the richest and the poorest in Britain has failed 
to narrow over the past decade. The truth is that change is slow 
and hard. According to the Institute of Fiscal Studies, income 
inequality rose to perhaps its highest ever levels in the ﬁrst ﬁve 
years of the Labour administration before falling back to the 
same levels seen in 1996-97.64
 Broadly speaking, over the past 60 years, life for most 
Britons has improved. On average, we live longer, we are 
healthier, we are better educated and many people enjoy a life-
style never available to their parents. Moreover, today we are 
far less likely to be trapped by the accident of our birth, which 
at the start of the last century would have made our careers, 
incomes and social status largely dependent on those of our 
parents. Wider social and economic change has opened oppor-
tunities for many less well-off families. Increased access to edu-
cational opportunities and programmes to give children a better 
start in life mean that, though socioeconomic status is still prob-
ably the best predictor of our fortunes, it no longer imposes the 
ironclad certainty of failure or success that it once did.
 Of men born in the 1950s, only 13% moved to a lower 
social class than their parents while 42% experienced upward 
mobility (36% for women born in the 1950s).65 However, 
examinations of absolute social mobility comparing more recent 
cohorts suggest that this historic shift has run out of steam 
in recent years. Analysis from the national child development 
study (which focused on children born in a speciﬁc week in 
1958) and from the birth cohort study (which did the same for 
children born in one week in 1970) demonstrates that children 
born to poorer families in 1970 were more likely to remain rela-
tively poorer as adults than children born from poorer families 
in 1958.66 The most authoritative studies have concluded that: 
‘it is difﬁcult to see evidence of a continuing increase in the total 
mobility rate post-1972’.67
 Alongside this, many Britons still do not achieve even the 
social and economic minima in income, education, health and 
housing. Large numbers do not have access to essential enti-
tlements, and all too frequently institutions fall short of basic 
human rights standards. Several areas of disadvantage have 
proved especially obstinate, and have not so far responded to 
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policy. For example, people with the lowest levels of qualiﬁca-
tions as a group have consistently, over the past few years, expe-
rienced rising levels of unemployment against a trend of increas-
ing employment for other groups. 
 As well as these limitations on our progress, other power-
ful drivers for social and economic inequality have emerged. As 
Chair of the forthcoming Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights, I am principally concerned with the fact that levels of 
material comfort are unevenly distributed, not only by socio-
economic group, but also by factors like age, disability, gender 
and race. In some cases these factors may be the cause of disad-
vantage by themselves, without any contribution from socio-
economic status. 
 Three areas of failure stand out: politics, business and 
the media. In Parliament, for example, there are ﬁfteen ethnic 
minority MPs (2.3% compared to 7.9% in the general popula-
tion), in business there are 121 directorships held by women 
in FTSE 100 companies (10.5%) and only four are held by 
women from an ethnic minority background, and in the media 
only 13% of editors of national newspapers are female.68 This is 
hardly surprising, given that this trinity probably represents the 
nexus of power in most western societies. Exclusion from the 
decision-making levels of these ﬁelds is the clearest indication 
possible of an imbalance of power within our society.
 Over the past 40 years we have introduced new measures, 
including anti-discrimination law, to tackle some non-socioeco-
nomic markers of disadvantage – ethnicity and race, gender, dis-
ability, sexual orientation and, latterly, age, religion and belief. 
Legal measures have had some positive effects. But law by itself 
has had limited success in dislodging some of the most stub-
born penalties. 
 Though anti-discrimination laws and other measures have 
reduced some gaps, others have not closed, and others have 
opened up. For example, the employment penalties faced by 
women as a group have steadily reduced over time. But other 
penalties have increased over the past 30 years – penalties asso-
ciated with ethnicity, disability and age were higher in the 1990s 
than in the 1970s.69 Most alarming is that in some groups (most 
frequently, but not exclusively, deﬁned by race or religion) dis-
advantage is effectively being passed from parent to child.
 Clear patterns of inequalities in employment over time can 
be seen from an analysis reviewing data over a 30-year period.70 
The analysis was targeted at the disadvantage, or ‘penalty’, asso-
ciated with disability, ethnicity or gender, correcting for other 
characteristics. 
 Taking as the ‘base case’ the normally most favoured group 
– non-disabled partnered white men below the age of 50 – in 
almost all circumstances this group outperforms every other 
(including single men) when it comes to labour market partici-
pation. Broadly speaking, over the 30-year period, almost all 
the chosen characteristics showed some employment gaps, and 
both the employment gaps and the penalties associated with age 
and ethnicity have become larger over the past 30 years. 
 Overall, there is an employment gap between ethnic 
minority people of working age and Whites of around 17%, 
with Whites standing at about 76% and ethnic minorities at 
around 59%.71 However, the picture is not as simple as this 
would suggest – there is considerable variation among ethnic 
groups and by gender. 
 Detailed analysis throws up some important ﬁndings. 
Surprisingly, if we compare the employment rates of Caribbean 
people with those of Whites there is, consistently, little overall 
difference – to all intents and purposes there is no net employ-
ment penalty for Caribbean people. Indeed, in the early 1980s 
Caribbeans were more likely to be employed than Whites. This 
unexpected ﬁnding is partly accounted for by the fact that most 
previous analyses concentrated on male employment. Analysis 
of employment penalties for Caribbean people by gender shows 
that Caribbean men are now indeed consistently less likely to 
be employed than Whites. This is a real penalty of around 4-
5%, accounted for entirely by ethnicity. Conversely, Caribbean 
women are more likely to be employed than comparable White 
women; that is to say, White women show an employment pen-
alty relative to Caribbean women.72 However, in other cases the 
impact of ethnicity is much more signiﬁcant. 
 There are three groups who the analysis shows are espe-
cially vulnerable in relation to labour market exclusion. The 
ﬁrst are people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage. Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi men suffered no serious employment penalty 
compared to Whites in the 1970s, but by the mid-1990s their 
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employment penalty had risen to 13%, though it has lessened 
slightly in recent years. Pakistani and Bangladeshi women suffer 
a much greater penalty compared to their White counterparts. 
Even after discounting the fact that they are more likely to have 
young children, their employment penalty during the past 30 
years ranges between 24% and 35% (though there is a small 
recent decrease, falling from 35% in 1996 to 31% in 2001). 
 The second group shown by this research to be especially 
disadvantaged are disabled people. The measure of disability 
used in the General Household Survey is a broad one, and it 
is plausible that disabled people with more signiﬁcant impair-
ments are more disadvantaged. The proportion of disabled 
people with a job declined from just over 60% in 1974, to only 
45% in 1995. And employment rates among non-disabled peo-
ple have risen during the period, increasing the gap from 12% 
to 33% in 2003. Though some of this gap can be explained by 
factors not directly related to disability, such as age and quali-
ﬁcations, the employment penalty associated purely with dis-
ability leapt from just 5% to about 18% in the mid-990s. It has 
steadied since then, but has not declined signiﬁcantly. 
 However, the employment penalties associated with dis-
ability and ethnicity look positively benign when set against 
those faced by women with children. Over the last 30 years, the 
employment penalties faced by women as a group have stead-
ily reduced over time. This trend was not caused by changes in 
the employment prospects for single women without children, 
or women with a partner but no children, whose penalties rela-
tive to partnered men remained more or less steady. It is the 
change in the labour market presence of the most disadvantaged 
women - mothers, especially of young children – that accounts 
for the bulk of the change for women overall. The penalty faced 
by mothers of young children with a partner fell from 69% 
in 1975 relative to partnered men to 40% in 2002 – a huge 
fall, but from a very high base. It is worth stressing that men’s 
employment rates are unaffected by fatherhood. Simply put, for 
women, the birth of a child is a major trigger episode that pro-
duces a long-lasting penalty; for men it is not.
 Comparing labour market participation of older and 
younger workers, we can see that in the mid-1970s older work-
ers experienced a penalty of about 3.5%; by 1995 this had 
grown to 8.5%, where it has remained more or less constant 
since then. For older people, there is a clear link between earlier 
life events and opportunities and outcomes in older age; for 
example, the link between income in retirement and absences 
from the labour market during working age, or the impact of 
education and socioeconomic status on resilience in older age. 
For people over 60, the group with the greatest net and physi-
cal wealth are those aged 60 to 64 – the group with the least are 
those aged 80 and over.73 Over the last eight years pensioners’ 
incomes have risen faster than earnings.74 However, on current 
trends, by 2035 only one-third of older people will have suf-
ﬁcient incomes to avoid the need for support from means-tested 
beneﬁts.75 Lower lifetime earnings for women mean lower 
contributions and lower pensions. Older people from ethnic 
minorities, particularly those from Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
communities, are three times more likely to have below-average 
income and are twice as likely to be in the lowest income quin-
tile in old age.76
 Beyond the personal or individual impact of these inequali-
ties on large swathes of Britain’s population, what does this all 
mean for us as a nation? The economic and demographic con-
text puts into stark perspective just how important these issues 
are for everybody’s continued wellbeing. Increasingly, this con-
text has a global dimension; it involves change at a structural 
level; it is moved and shaped by forces that are integral to the 
development of a modern post-industrial nation in an age of 
globalisation.
 The labour market has changed radically in recent decades. 
A reduction in the number of manufacturing vacancies and a 
rise in service sector jobs have made more job opportunities 
available to women. However, the very nature of those jobs 
has given rise to new inequalities – with more women in part-
time, low-paid work. The move towards a higher added-value, 
knowledge-based economy in the UK, coupled with the educa-
tional underperformance by boys, disabled people and by some 
ethnic minority communities, could signal the emergence of 
signiﬁcant new kinds of inequality based on gender, disability 
and race. Failure to capture the potential contribution of all 
these groups of individuals could, in itself, emerge as a signiﬁ-
cant obstacle to growth and competitiveness over the medium 
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and long term. It is estimated that, by 2010, only a ﬁfth of the 
workforce will be what is currently considered the ‘default’ 
employee – that is white, non-disabled, male and under 45.77
 So, whether the question is observed by a progressive 
concerned with fairness and social justice, or from a dispas-
sionate Benthamite stance concerned only with our economic 
development, it is evident that equality matters more and more 
for Britain. The case should be increasingly self-evident, and 
our collective failure to turn warm words into concrete action 
is increasingly untenable. By action, I do not mean that we 
should continue tinkering at the edges creating concessions that 
allow more of us to operate like the ‘default’ employee. Too 
often, measures to improve equality in the workplace equate 
to making it easier for women, for example, to better ﬁt into a 
pattern of working that was set by and for men. But given the 
demographic changes that will transform the face of our work-
places over the next few years, it is not feasible for yesterday’s 
default employee to set the rules. For this reason, it is no longer 
enough to make better umbrellas for the disadvantaged; instead 
we must change the weather. If not, we risk falling behind as a 
nation unable to sustain ongoing economic development. This 
is not a minority concern; it truly matters for everybody.
 Law, leadership and gradual cultural change have gone 
some way in tackling discrimination per se – although progress 
has been uneven across the different dimensions of inequality 
and in different aspects of life, economic and otherwise. The 
more recent equality legislation has sought to go further than 
merely preventing discrimination towards actively remedying 
deﬁcits and promoting equality. This theme of proactivity, start-
ing with the race equality duty placed on public authorities by 
the Race Relations Act (2000), has now started to dominate 
discourse on race equality. It is increasingly well understood 
that, while remedies for discrimination against individuals are 
crucial, they have failed to make a dent in the aggregate disad-
vantages suffered by various groups. We must address the struc-
tural factors that give rise to persistent disadvantage. 
 One way in which a proactive stance could be put into 
practice would be through greater use of the – relatively 
neglected – positive action measures that were allowed for in 
the 1976 Race Relations Act. This provision permits employ-
ers to encourage applications from a particular racial group, or 
offer training, if that group has been severely underrepresented 
in a certain type of work over a twelve-month period. The aim 
is to ensure that people from previously excluded ethnic minor-
ity groups can compete on equal terms with other applicants, 
making up for the accumulated effects of past discrimination. 
 However, the Race Relations Act does not allow positive 
discrimination or afﬁrmative action. Selection itself must be 
based on merit and treat all applicants equally, so an employer 
cannot try to change the balance of the workforce by selecting 
someone mainly because she or he is from a particular racial 
group. 
 This begs the question – is anti-discrimination law ﬂexible 
enough to secure equality, or do we need to start considering 
a role for exercising a preference for diversity in order to rebal-
ance our workforces? 
 A number of public organisations – universities, police 
authorities and local authorities, for example – who regard 
greater diversity as essential to their operational success have 
drawn attention to the limits placed on them by equality leg-
islation. Police forces are set recruitment targets by the Home 
Ofﬁce (targets that, incidentally, most chief constables accept 
are necessary to achieve for operational reasons) but complain 
that the requirements of the Race Relations Act and the Sex 
Discrimination Act prevent them from taking actions that 
would help them to achieve these targets. Similarly, universi-
ties concerned that some of their courses are becoming pre-
dominantly female, to the exclusion of young White males, are 
concerned that they may not have the ﬂexibility to make special 
provisions to encourage a more balanced intake.
 Taking a look at the evidence bears out these concerns. 
Measuring the momentum with which some of the inequalities 
in Britain are being corrected presents a depressing picture.78 
For example, at the current rate of change we will only elect a 
representative House of Commons in 2080, close the gender 
pay gap in 2085, and close the ethnic employment gap in 2105. 
Ending the 50+ employment penalty is not likely to happen 
in this lifetime. We will probably never close the disability 
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employment gap. And we will deﬁnitely never close the ethnic 
qualiﬁcation gap – given the current rate of change in the wrong 
direction. 
 Given the signiﬁcance of the more intractable inequalities 
outlined above, the case for balancing measures to redress gaps 
between groups should be irresistible. However, the case is chal-
lenged by the difﬁculty of explaining the difference between 
measures intended to change outcomes for groups at an aggre-
gate level, and the preferential treatment of individual members 
of particular groups. Preventing discrimination against indi-
viduals is, of course, important – but it will not shift mountains. 
The goal is to remedy disadvantage at a structural level by 
changing the framework in which decisions are made: for exam-
ple, by examining how job entry systems affect different groups 
and taking steps to ensure that application and success rates are 
balanced. Tackling aggregate disadvantage requires us to recog-
nise that disadvantage in the ﬁrst place – to acknowledge that 
group poverty and inequality strip people of their individual 
capability to access the opportunities that are theoretically avail-
able to all. This is why treating people fairly does not always 
mean treating everyone the same.
 What might balancing measures look like? Clearly they 
would have to vary to ﬁt the circumstances of any particular 
problem. However, we have already seen measures taken to 
address the apparently intractable and clearly unjustiﬁable 
under-representation of women elected members in the House 
of Commons. In 2002, Parliament concluded that it had to 
give political parties more leeway to take special measures to 
change the gender balance of the candidates they put before the 
electorate.79 Until 2015, the selection of election candidates by 
political parties has been exempted from certain aspects of the 
Sex Discrimination Act to enable positive action to try to ensure 
greater gender balance in political representation. 
 The important features of this exceptional step are that:
•  it was introduced to remedy a clearly quantiﬁable equality gap 
that seemed impervious to other remedies;
•  the inequality involved was widely held to have reduced the cred-
ibility and the effectiveness of the institution involved (including 
the House of Commons);
•  the relaxation of the law is not permanent; it was envisaged 
that when a more acceptable balance was achieved this special 
measure would lapse.
And it has made a signiﬁcant difference, resulting in a far more 
representative House of Commons (albeit from a low base), 
which has greater legitimacy as a result.
 But are we ready to take such drastic action on equality 
in other ﬁelds? At the moment, there is evidence to suggest 
that the British people are not yet prepared for the changes 
around the corner, or what they perforce mean for our attitudes 
towards inequality. There is little public agreement on what 
is meant by equality in practice. There is public commitment 
to the idea of fairness, but it is weakly supported or not well 
understood, in particular in relation to the allocation of pub-
lic resource and political attention to equality measures. The 
British Social Attitudes Survey in 2004, for example, explored 
public attitudes to inequality of income in Britain. The survey 
showed that nearly three-quarters of respondents said that the 
gap between those with high and low incomes is too large; 
however only one-third of respondents agreed that govern-
ment should redistribute incomes from one group to another.80 
Further exploration of the issues, however, showed that the 
picture is much more complex. Nearly nine in ten favoured tax 
and spending policies whose overall impact is clearly redistribu-
tive, including most of those who, when asked directly, did not 
explicitly support redistribution. 
 It appears that there is strong support for increased social 
justice and help for the more disadvantaged in society, but that 
this general feeling is not well articulated or translated into 
support for practical programmes. Worse still, in the absence 
of an agreed framework for discussion about equality, debates 
about priorities and policy can easily degenerate into unseemly 
competitions between groups of disadvantaged people, or into 
accusations of special pleading. A key problem for the Equalities 
Review, which I chair, is how to develop a modern case for 
equality, along with the language and concepts that we need 
in order to explain what the problem is, identify what needs to 
be done, and persuade the public of its importance (and its rel-
evance to each person’s life).
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 At the very least, I hope that the Equalities Review work 
will break open a debate on the meaning of equality in the 21st 
century so that we can start to see more clearly what all of it 
really means and how society needs to change. If not, the risk is 
that we will continue helplessly to produce ever-more umbrellas 
while the ﬂoodwaters creep up past our shoulders. 
7. Aspiration and community81 
Sir Jonathan Sacks
 
The great concern of Moses was . . . to lay the foundation of a social state 
in which deep poverty and degrading want should be unknown.
Henry George, Moses.
‘Think of a stretch limousine driving through an urban 
ghetto,’ writes Martin Wolf of the Financial Times.82 ‘Inside is 
the post-industrial world of western Europe, North America, 
Australasia, Japan and the emerging Paciﬁc Rim. Outside are all 
the rest.’ That is what a globalised planet is rapidly becoming: 
one in which wealth is ever-more unevenly distributed, in which 
the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Each year there are 
more billionaires. Each year millions die of starvation, poverty 
and preventable disease. That is the difference between micro- 
and macroeconomics. In each individual transaction, both sides 
gain. But when the results of billions of transactions are aggre-
gated, their effects can be, and often are, massively inequitable. 
That is something globalisation has magniﬁed, not diminished. 
It turns the planet into a single market with highly mobile funds 
and near-perfect information and competition. Investment 
moves from country to country, seeking maximal returns with-
out regard to human consequences. Our world is getting less 
equal by the year.
 That inequality exists both within and between countries. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, worldwide con-
sumption of goods and services grew six-fold. But according to 
a United Nations survey, one-sixth of the world’s population 
– a billion people – live on less than a dollar a day and cannot 
satisfy the most basic human needs. More than eight million 
81 This chapter is extracted 
from J Sacks, ‘Compassion: 
The idea of tzedakah’ in The 
Dignity of Difference: How to 
avoid the clash of civilizations, 
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die each year because of polluted water or contaminated air. Six 
million die from malnutrition or starvation. Two million die 
from diarrhoea or related diseases.83 AIDS has already claimed 
the lives of ten million Africans and is projected to kill 25 mil-
lion more in the next decade. Among the 4.5 billion inhabit-
ants of developing countries, three in ﬁve lack access to basic 
infrastructure. A third have no drinkable water. A quarter live in 
substandard accommodation. A ﬁfth have no sanitary or medi-
cal services. In Africa, the poorest region of the world, 174 of 
every thousand children fail to reach the age of ﬁve. A ﬁfth of 
the world’s children spend less than ﬁve years in school. The 
same percentage are permanently undernourished.84
 And the gap grows. Between 1965 and 1999, real incomes 
per head in the developed countries rose by 2.4%. Those in 
the Middle East and North Africa stayed roughly the same. In 
sub-Saharan Africa they fell. Eighty-nine countries are worse off 
now than they were ten years ago. Thirty-ﬁve have experienced 
a greater fall than during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Worldwide, the top 20% of high-income earners account for 
86% of all private consumption, while the poorest 20% account 
for only 1.3%. The richest ﬁfth consume sixteen times more 
meat, seventeen times more energy and 145 times more cars 
than the poorest ﬁfth. Sixty-ﬁve per cent of the world’s popula-
tion have never made a telephone call. Forty per cent have no 
access to electricity. Americans spend more on cosmetics, and 
Europeans on ice cream, than it would cost to provide school-
ing and sanitation for the two billion people who currently go 
without both.
 It is morally impossible not to be troubled by the ever-
growing gap between the few at the top and the many at the 
bottom of the economic ladder. What makes the present situa-
tion worse than in the past is that these inequalities are visible. 
When the horizons of the majority of mankind were limited to 
the next village or town, inequalities might exist throughout the 
world but few were aware of them on a daily basis. There were 
fabled lands where gold ran free, but that was somewhere else 
in a world of legends and dreams. The global media have trans-
formed all this. Television has brought the world of the rich and 
famous to the most remote villages, while bringing images of 
hunger, famine, war and disease into our living rooms. We can 
no longer claim that we did not know.
 Nor are traditional defences of inequality sustainable today. 
The worldview of antiquity and the middle ages was built on 
the belief that differences in power, wealth and status were part 
of the ordained order. Status was a given of birth. Hierarchy 
was written into the fabric of the universe. 
 Why then does it continue? Many defenders of the new, 
globalised economy argue – rightly, in my view – that it is the 
best chance nations have of defeating poverty. Countries that 
have embraced it, most notably in South-East Asia, but also in 
South America, have prospered. So has India, which has devel-
oped a highly effective information-technology base. The eco-
nomic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping in China in 1978 
helped eight hundred million peasants to double their incomes 
in a mere six years. Seventy-six million Chinese moved out of 
poverty in the past decade alone.85
 But not every nation has access to the new technologies. 
They are on the other side of the so-called digital divide. Nor 
have world economic policies always been to the beneﬁt of 
the poorest. Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, 
former chief economist of the World Bank, has been highly 
critical of international ﬁnancial institutions for the way they 
have imposed inappropriate strategies on failing economies. 
Economic liberalisation can make the strong stronger but the 
weak weaker. Stiglitz compares some of the economic policies 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund on poor countries 
to setting small boats loose on a rough sea. Even if the boats are 
sound and well captained, they are likely to be hit broadside by 
a big wave and capsize.86
 A world in which the few prosper and many starve offends 
against our deepest sense of fairness and human solidarity. You 
do not have to be a convinced egalitarian to know that dispari-
ties of this magnitude – vast, concentrated wealth alongside 
widespread suffering – is intolerable. The real problem, though, 
is one of responsibility. No one planned this outcome. It hap-
pened as a result of billions of transactions, investments and 
purchasing decisions. As Robert Reich reminds us:
The emergence of the global, high-tech economy seems largely out of 
anyone’s hands. One development seems to have sparked the next, with-
85 Op.cit., ref. 83. 
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out any clear decision having been made about consequences. No one 
explicitly decided that technologies of communication, transportation, 
and information would advance as quickly as they have. Or that these 
technologies would push the economy from large-scale production toward 
a wide array of innovative products and services, with easy switching to 
better ones… Nor, especially, did anyone decide to accept the downsides of 
all this progress.87 
The invisible hand – the unanticipated outcome of a myriad 
actions and reactions – is not always benign.
 There are no easy solutions, but there are hard questions. 
What is our responsibility to humanity as a whole? What bonds 
of obligation link us to those with whom we do not share a 
country, a political structure, a language or culture? What pro-
portion of our wealth, if any, are we duty bound to share? The 
language of rights is not always helpful here, because rights 
presuppose a network of law and obligation that can implement 
them. A right is like a cheque: it has value only if there is a bank 
and an account against which it can be drawn. Without that it is 
mere expectation without delivery. What then is the moral basis 
of global economic responsibility?
 At this level, religious concepts are more helpful than nar-
rowly political or economic ones. The central insight of mono-
theism - that if God is the parent of humanity, then we are all 
members of a single extended family – has become more real in 
its implications than ever before. The Enlightenment gave us 
the concept of universal rights, but this remains a ‘thin’ moral-
ity, stronger in abstract ideas than in its grip on the moral imag-
ination. Far more powerful is the biblical idea that those in need 
are our brothers and sisters and that poverty is something we 
feel in our bones. The great faiths do more than give abstract 
expression to our shared humanity; they move us to action and 
give compelling shape to the claims of others upon us.
 I want to examine the Jewish experience because it com-
bines two elements that are particularly relevant to our present 
situation. On the one hand, Judaism is sympathetic to the free 
market and limited government as the best defences of individu-
al liberty and creativity. On the other, it was aware from the days 
of Moses that an open economy does not guarantee just out-
comes in the larger sense of a society in which everyone has the 
means of a digniﬁed existence. This, to Moses and the prophets, 
was a matter of deep concern. In the words of one contempo-
rary biblical scholar: ‘From the start, Israel lived with a covenant 
charter which put optimum value on a people in egalitarian 
relations under one sovereign divine power.’88 Early Israelite 
religion was the attempt to create a ‘heterogeneous, classless, 
decentralized association of tribes conceived as a brotherhood 
– and at least in larger measure than in Canaanite society, as a 
sisterhood – of social, economic and political equals.’89 That 
involved a commitment, one we can trace through biblical 
legislation and prophetic utterance to an economic order that 
balanced freedom with equity. To understand it, we must ﬁrst 
understand the idea contained in one of Judaism’s key words. 
 In two verses in the book of Genesis, God speciﬁes the 
mission with which Abraham and his descendants are to be 
charged:
Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do? Abraham will surely 
become a great and powerful nation, and all nations of the earth will 
be blessed through him. For I have chosen him so that he will direct his 
children and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing 
what is right [tzedakah] and just [mishpat], so that the Lord will 
bring about for Abraham what He has promised him. (Genesis 18:17-
19)
The two words, tzedakah and mishpat, signify different forms of 
justice. Mishpat means retributive justice or the rule of law. A 
free society must be governed by law, impartially administered, 
through which the guilty are punished, the innocent acquitted, 
and human rights secured. Tzedakah, by contrast, refers to dis-
tributive justice, a less procedural and more substantive idea.
 It is difﬁcult to translate tzedakah because it combines in 
a single word two notions normally opposed to one another, 
namely charity and justice. Suppose, for example, that I give 
someone £100. Either he is entitled to it, or he is not. If he is, 
then my act is a form of justice. If he is not, it is an act of char-
ity. In English (as with the Latin terms caritas and iustitia) a 
gesture of charity cannot be an act of justice, nor can an act of 
justice be described as charity. Tzedakah is therefore an unusual 
term, because it means both.
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 It arises from the theology of Judaism, which insists on 
the difference between possession and ownership. Ultimately, 
all things are owned by God, creator of the world. What we 
possess, we do not own – we merely hold it in trust for God. 
The clearest example is the provision in Leviticus: ‘The land 
must not be sold permanently because the land is Mine; you 
are merely strangers and temporary residents in relation to Me’ 
(Leviticus 25:23). If there were absolute ownership, there would 
be a difference between justice (what we are bound to give oth-
ers) and charity (what we give others out of generosity). The 
former would be a legally enforceable duty, the latter, at most, 
a moral obligation, the prompting of benevolence or sympathy. 
In Judaism, however, because we are not owners of our prop-
erty but merely guardians on God’s behalf, we are bound by the 
conditions of trusteeship, one of which is that we share part of 
what we have with others in need. What would be regarded as 
charity in other legal systems is, in Judaism, a strict requirement 
of the law and can, if necessary, be enforced by the courts.
 What tzedakah signiﬁes, therefore, is what is often called 
‘social justice’, meaning that no one should be without the basic 
requirements of existence, and that those who have more than 
they need must share some of that surplus with those who have 
less. This is absolutely fundamental to the kind of society the 
Israelites were charged with creating, namely one in which eve-
ryone has a basic right to a digniﬁed life and to be equal citizens 
in the covenantal community under the sovereignty of God. So, 
for example, the covenant code speciﬁes:
 Do not ill-treat a stranger [i.e. a non-Israelite] or oppress him, for 
you were strangers in the land of Egypt.
 Do not take advantage of a widow or orphan. If you do, and they 
cry out to Me, I will certainly hear their cry . . . 
 If you lend money to one of My people among you who is needy, do 
not be like a money-lender: charge him no interest.
 If you take your neighbour’s cloak as a pledge, return it to him  
by sunset, because his cloak is the only covering he has for his body.  
What else will he sleep in? When he cries out to Me, I will hear, for I am 
compassionate. (Exodus 22:21-27)
God, for the Israelites, was actively concerned in the economic 
and political order, especially with those who, because they 
lacked power, or even a ‘voice’, became the victims of injustice 
and inequity:
He upholds the cause of the oppressed,
And gives food to the hungry.
The Lord sets prisoners free.
The Lord gives sight to the blind, 
The Lord lifts up those who are bowed down,
The Lord loves the righteous.
The Lord watches over the stranger,
And sustains the fatherless and the widow,
But He frustrates the way of the wicked. (Psalm 146: 7-9)
The society the Israelites were to construct would stand as a 
living contrast to what they experienced in Egypt: poverty, per-
secution and enslavement. Their release from bondage was only 
the ﬁrst stage on their journey to freedom. The second – their 
covenant with God – involved collective responsibility to ensure 
that no one would be excluded from the shared graciousness 
of the community and its life. Hence the Bible’s insistence that 
a free society cannot be built on mishpat, the rule of law, alone. 
It requires also tzedakah, a just distribution of resources. This 
view has close afﬁnities with Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Amartya Sen’s concept of ‘development as freedom’:
 The adult who lacks the means of having medical treat-
ment for an ailment from which she suffers is not only prey to 
preventable morbidity and possibly escapable mortality, but 
may also be denied the freedom to do various things – for her-
self and for others – that she may wish to do as a responsible 
human being. The bonded labourer born into semi-slavery, the 
subjugated girl child stiﬂed by a repressive society, the help-
less landless labourer without substantial means of earning an 
income are all deprived not only in terms of well-being, but also 
in terms of the ability to lead responsible lives, which are con-
tingent on having certain basic freedoms. Responsibility requires 
freedom.90
 Sen has, I believe, put it absolutely correctly. Individual 
freedom may be best described, as Isaiah Berlin argued, in terms 
of ‘negative liberty’, namely the absence of constraints (chofesh 
90 A Sen, Development as 
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in biblical Hebrew). But collective freedom (cherut in Hebrew) is 
something else. It means, among other things, that my freedom 
is not bought at the price of yours. A society in which the few 
prosper but the many starve, in which some but not all have 
access to good education, health care, and other essential ameni-
ties, is not a place of liberty. That requires more than an absence 
of coercion. It involves the removal of barriers to the exercise 
of responsible citizenship: ‘poverty as well as tyranny, poor 
economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, 
neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity 
of repressive states.’91
 With the transition, some two thousand years ago, from 
biblical to post-biblical Judaism, we ﬁnd a greater emphasis 
on tzedakah, the direct provision of ﬁnancial aid, as opposed 
to agricultural produce. Israel had become less of an agrarian 
economy, more a society of small businesses and trade, and rab-
binic law is a systematic attempt to apply the principles of the 
Bible to new economic circumstances. Communal taxes were 
instituted. New forms of distribution were set up, among them 
the tamchui, which distributed food daily, and the kuppah, which 
weekly provided funds for those in need. The disbursement 
of tzedakah funds called for high standards of probity, so to be 
appointed as a distributor of communal funds became one of 
the highest accolades the community could give.
 The key text here was Deuteronomy 15:8: ‘You shall open 
your hand wide to him [the poor person] and shall surely lend 
him sufﬁcient for his need in that which he lacks.’ The rabbis 
took this to include gifts as well as loans. More importantly, 
they read it as offering a deﬁnition of the kinds of poverty they 
were called on to address:
Sufﬁcient for his need – means that you are commanded to maintain 
him, but you are not commanded to make him rich. That which he 
lacks – means even a horse to ride on and a slave to run before him. It is 
told of Hillel the elder [head of the Jewish community in the ﬁrst century 
BCE] that he bought for a certain poor man of good family a horse to 
ride on and a slave to run before him. On one occasion he could not ﬁnd 
a slave to run before him, so he himself ran before him for three miles.92
There are two kinds of poverty according to this interpretation. 
The ﬁrst (‘sufﬁcient for his need’) refers to an absolute subsist-
ence level. In Jewish law this was taken to include food, hous-
ing, basic furniture and, if necessary, funds to pay for a wed-
ding. The second (‘that which he lacks’) means relative poverty 
– relative, however, not to others but to the individual’s own 
previous standard of living. This is the ﬁrst indication of some-
thing that plays an important role in the rabbinic understanding 
of poverty. Over and above sheer physical needs is a psychologi-
cal dimension. Poverty humiliates, and a good society will not 
allow humiliation.
 Judaism represents a highly distinctive approach to the 
idea of equality, namely that it is best served not by equality of 
income or wealth, nor even of opportunity. Nor is it sufﬁcient 
that we each have equal standing before God at times of prayer, 
and before the law in cases of dispute. A society must ensure 
equal dignity – the Hebrew phrase is kavod habriyot, ‘human 
honour’ – to each of its members.
 The prophets, who lived and worked more than two-and-
a-half thousand years ago, were the world’s ﬁrst social critics, 
unashamed to deliver their message to kings and speak truth to 
power. Religion has, they argued, a moral, social and economic 
dimension. It involves justice, not merely in the narrow sense of 
the rule of law and the transparency of procedures, but also in 
the substantive sense of conferring on all members of society an 
honoured place. And what, in the days of the prophets, applied 
socially, today applies globally. The scope of our interconnected-
ness deﬁnes the radius of responsibility and concern.
 Tzedakah is a concept for our time. The retreat from a 
welfare state set in motion by Reagonomics and Thatcherism, 
together with the deregulation of ﬁnancial markets throughout 
the world, have led to increased and increasing inequalities 
in both developed countries and the developing world. The 
importance of tzedakah is that it does not mean ‘charity’. It is 
not optional, nor does it depend on the goodwill of those who 
give to others. It is a legally enforceable obligation. Nor does 
it depend on any speciﬁc economic doctrine. It goes hand in 
hand with a free market, while recognising that the market has 
inherent limits. George Soros is right when he admits that: 
‘International trade and global ﬁnancial markets are very good 
at generating wealth, but they cannot take care of other social 
91 ibid., p. 3. 
 
92 Babylonian Talmud, 
Ketubot, p. 67b.
88   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   89
needs, such as the preservation of peace, alleviation of poverty, 
protection of the environment, labor conditions, or human 
rights – what are generally called “public goods”.’93
 The inequities of markets are no reason to abandon the 
market. Globalisation has led to increased prosperity for those 
countries who have participated in it. We will not cure poverty 
by destroying a system of wealth-creation, any more than we 
will cure illness by abolishing doctors or end crime by annul-
ling law. New technologies and the growth of trade are our best 
– our only – hope for ending hunger, curing disease and raising 
living standards throughout the world. This, the rabbis recog-
nised. The Talmud imagines the following dialogue between 
King David and his advisers: 
At dawn, the wise men of Israel came to David and said, ‘O Lord, the 
king, your people Israel need sustenance.’ He said, ‘Let them support one 
another.’ They replied, ‘A handful cannot satisfy a lion, and you cannot 
ﬁll a pit by the earth which you dig from it.’94
David proposed redistribution. His sages told him that the cake 
was not big enough, however it was sliced. Economic growth is 
more powerful than simple redistribution. But that is true only 
if there is a genuine willingness on the part of those who gain 
to ensure that the losers also beneﬁt; and that does not happen 
through the market mechanism on its own.
 No religion can propose precise policies for the alleviation 
of hunger and disease. What it can do, and must, is to inspire us 
collectively with a vision of human solidarity and with concepts, 
such as tzedakah within the Jewish tradition and its counter-
parts in other faiths, that serve as a broad moral template for 
what constitutes a fair and decent world. Globalisation, writes 
Zygmunt Bauman, ‘divides as much as it unites… signalling 
a new freedom for some, upon many others it descends as an 
uninvited and cruel fate.’95 There can be no doubt that more 
– much more – of the economic surplus of advanced economies 
should be invested in developing countries to help eradicate 
extremes of poverty and hunger, ensure universal education, 
combat treatable disease, reduce infant mortality, improve work 
conditions and reconstruct failing economies. As with tzedakah, 
the aim should be to restore dignity and independence to 
nations as well as individuals. This has now become an urgent 
imperative. The globalisation of communications, trade and 
culture, globalises human responsibility likewise. The freedom 
of the few may not be purchased at the price of the enslavement 
of the many to poverty, ignorance and disease. 
93 G Soros, The Crisis of 
Global Capitalism (Little, 
Brown & Co, 2002), p. 14 
 
94 Babylonian Talmud, 
Berakhoto 3b. 
 
95 Z Bauman, Globalisation: 
The human consequences 
(Polity Press, 1998), p. 2. 
90   The Politics of Aspiration The Politics of Aspiration   91
Two case studies:  
making a difference 
8: The gateless wall: a 
discourse on participation
Camila Batmanghelidjh
We live in an age where there is intense preoccupation about 
legitimate participation. Those with power to make decisions 
and create social policies have promised themselves that they 
will include the excluded. Agencies have been created to achieve 
the inclusion agenda. The social exclusion and social inclusion 
ministries lead, with their varied metamorphoses, following 
in hot pursuit. In education, culture, sports, regeneration and 
media, inclusion is the Holy Grail.
 However, despite such aspiration, there remains something 
of a diss-ease. From the streets where Kids Company operates, 
supporting 11,000 vulnerable children and families, the inclu-
sion agenda appears to be failing. One in ﬁve children suffer 
from emotional and mental health difﬁculties. The bulk of the 
academies, with their computers and buildings boasting ‘state-
of-the-art’, are still struggling to achieve academically. There 
is also a signiﬁcant youth crime problem: children are killing, 
stealing, and creating ghettos in which they victimise them-
selves and visitors who cross the path. The hostels and the hous-
ing estates boast drug economies, which surpass in proﬁt some 
of the FTSE top 100 companies. 
 The inclusion agenda may be failing for a number of  
reasons, some of which I’d like to explore in this paper.
 I have chosen the title of ‘The gateless wall’, but it could 
either be bricked up with no entry, or have a path through that 
is so clearly unavailable for the passing that a gate is not needed. 
I believe that the inclusion agenda is being conceived in such a 
ﬂawed way that, unwittingly, it has generated a brick wall, creat-
ing divisions. 
 Divisions emerge when situations are split into those who 
act and those who are subjects, or subjected, to that action. 
Intrinsic in this kind of structure is a power imbalance, with 
one half being recipients of the other half ’s ‘gifts’. What gets 
missed is mutual participation. This divide is unwittingly gen-
erated because those who have comfortable and choice-plenty 
opportunities ﬁrst feed their own needs, and then gather what 
they have spare in order to share it with those who have not. 
The decision, the distribution of favours and goods, is primarily 
with the giver, and the recipient has to make good use passively 
and be appreciative of what has been given to them. 
 The brick wall separating the two emanates from a compas-
sion-negative position. In genuine compassion there is a fusion 
between care-giver and care-recipient whereby, at the point of 
alleviating suffering or creating potentials together, they are 
uniformly equalised and united in the moment. The moment is 
when mind, action, spirit and event are mutually perceived and 
shared. For compassion to be at its most effective, the individu-
alist ego of both care-giver and recipient is overridden by an 
understanding of a shared task and goal. 
 The current social inclusion agenda, I would argue, is 
failing because it is compassion-negative. It is morally and 
philosophically ﬂawed, and it lacks humility on the part of the 
care-giver. The arrogance presents itself because the care-giver 
is setting the care-recipient an agenda of achievement that is 
relevant to the ‘I’ worldview rather than to the ‘your’ or ‘our 
joint’ worldview. The ‘I’ worldview believes that the space the 
care-giver is residing in has superior qualities, which the care-
recipient must be elevated to. To those ends, the care-giver 
identiﬁes for the care-recipient the targets that have to be met. 
This is manifest in every aspect of the social inclusion agenda. 
In education, it is about levels of literacy, numeracy and the rat 
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race of league tables. In culture, it’s the tick-box tyranny of get-
ting ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and every slice of 
exclusion manifestation through the gallery and museum doors. 
In business, it’s about forcing employees to make one day’s con-
tact with that ‘other world’, so that the organisation can boast 
its corporate social responsibility manifestation in its annual 
report – to the condescending nod of the shareholders. 
 Nothing is sadder than the perversion of inclusion that  
has become an industry, as it is sarcastically viewed from the 
ghettos. As this ﬂorid action and expenditure cajoles to elevate 
the ghetto to perceived levels of excellence, the brick wall  
separating the two thickens and mutual rage seeps through 
across the divide.
 What would make the space gateless, and allow genuine 
access? In the spirit of making theory manifest in practice, I’m 
going to help you enter the worldview of the children Kids 
Company works with. I often hear providers protest that so 
much opportunity is made available to these young people, yet 
these providers do not engage and participate. If a provider 
entered one of these children’s world-spaces the comprehension 
would make visible the barriers to participation. 
 We at Kids Company began to understand the process of 
alienation only when we agreed to be ‘in community’ with these 
young people; it meant spending time with them, listening to 
them, travelling to the places they went, and sharing with them 
their emotional experiences. What we learned is that the ability 
to participate requires an emotional readiness and availability, 
all of us do not come to the point of opportunity with the same 
prerequisites. 
 Children who have grown up in conditions of terror devel-
op hyper-vigilance and a chemistry of urgency. As toddlers they 
are helpless and passive bystanders who witness domestic vio-
lence, crazed and dangerous behaviour – the terrorised imprint-
ing of horriﬁc images dominates their brain and emotional 
space. Initially the bystander child is damaged and the pow-
erlessness leaves a legacy of humiliation. The profound sense 
of having no impact on preventing violence towards others, 
and towards the self, brings the vulnerable child defencelessly 
into contact with a sense of catastrophic redundancy. The only 
ammunition against such overpowering experiences while you 
are small is to switch off the ability to feel. In being numb, the 
child ceases to protest and occupies a dead space where there is 
neither a striving for life, nor a seeking of death. The neutralised 
child separates from the human world and becomes a far-away 
emotional island. 
 Sometimes, as these children grow up, their physical bel-
lies rumble for food and they reach a primitive perception of 
the world as a space in which you have to survive through your 
own initiative because no one takes responsibility for protecting 
you or honouring your childhood. The child, savaged, will learn 
the currency of cruelty in order to make a shift from victim to 
perpetrator – from underdog to top dog. Place a young person 
whose mindset is about survival in an academy where the agen-
da is aspiration, and you place him in front of a gateless brick 
wall, because there’s a disjuncture between his worldview and 
your worldview. 
 This child is astute enough to comprehend that the legiti-
mate world you represent and embody is the space of power, 
honour and achievement. The child looks on and realises that in 
comparison, and in your eyes, because he or she cannot operate 
through your worldview he is smaller than you and powerless 
in relation to your structure. The power discrepancy acceler-
ates the experience of humiliation and the child, yet again, is 
plunged into a ﬁght-ﬂight expression. The ﬂight is the self-
exclusion, the truancy and the avoidance. The ﬁght is redeﬁning 
the currency of power by creating an agenda within the school 
culture where his brand of power, achieved through violence, 
becomes a perverse and illegitimate structure within which he is 
superior. A dichotomy of potency is created within the school. 
The aspirational worldview proposes power through achieve-
ment, sticking to rules and participation. The illegitimate 
power structure demands destruction, breaking rules and being 
empowered through violence.
 Who is going to be the winner? Invariably the one who has 
managed to give up the most is the one who becomes the most 
powerful. The suicidally powerful child, in giving up the will 
to self-preserve, acquires a potency that comes of being able to 
negate the self, not because it’s a sacriﬁce, but because trauma 
has made the self so meaningless as to not be worth preserving. 
 The achiever, on the other hand, has been fed with a world-
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view in which he has become the commodity; attainment and 
status are sought in order for the human being to become a 
desirable object. Sadly, this too is survival behaviour. Lack of 
achievement risks making the individual not worthy of being 
chosen. Both the achiever and the non-achiever in this scenario 
reside in a space where there is a negation of being for being’s 
sake - that is, for the sake of connecting, for the sake of lov-
ing, for sharing humanity, for participating in mutually crea-
tive tasks. Both sets of children experience a brick wall. One is 
deﬁned as the social failure, the other is paraded as social suc-
cess, but both represent a profound perversion of human and 
humanitarian values. 
 This abusive cycle is further perpetuated by those who fund 
social intervention initiatives, and often those who deliver them. 
The business representative travels to the ghettos heavy with 
his egocentric philanthropy. He too brings his worldview to 
the situation. He seeks a legacy, a personal deﬁnition of quality, 
which his money must buy. In his helping glance the recipient 
is turned into an object upon which he’s going to act his sense 
of power and potency. He wants outcomes, tangible, manifest 
on the page; sometimes he wants objects like computers or a 
building that never escape the memory of his donation. And 
like a grovelling beggar, humiliated and trapped into this vision, 
the social catalysts distort the spirit of their work. Similarly, they 
turn the client into an object for the collusive outcome desired, 
because the money is needed and the donor has to be pleased. 
Truth and courage are compromised, and a rift is generated as 
the recipient’s needs no longer form the centre of the creative 
task, but the donor’s need takes precedent.
 You may well interject, why can’t both their needs be met 
simultaneously? They can, but that’s a transaction. It’s not com-
passion or the expression of it. The mutuality does not evolve 
around the most urgent need; it evolves around an exchange of 
commodities. 
 A concrete understanding of opportunities also manifests 
itself in the equality agenda. The best understanding of equal-
ity, paradoxically, rests in embracing diversity. The individual 
is perceived as unique, needing equally individually tailored 
interventions and opportunities. The equality agenda becomes 
destructive when it is represented as equal opportunities, i.e. the 
same for everyone. In homogenisation there is an equally anti-
compassion agenda whereby the opportunity becomes domi-
nant into which the individual must be accommodated. This 
type of thinking creates a brick wall while attempting to remove 
barriers to access.
 As the child’s most urgent requirements are not addressed, 
the child is left humiliated and further alienated. Opportunities 
look toxic; they are meaningless offerings because they miss 
his meaning of the moment. On both sides of the wall anger 
resides. The opportunity-providers experience frustration 
as their aspirational offerings are not taken up. The recipi-
ent is described as unappreciative, lacking in aspiration, and 
intrinsically seeking failure. It is never acknowledged that in 
not providing appropriate and meaningful interventions the 
failure resides with the opportunity-providers. Simultaneously, 
the failed and vulnerable child takes on board the mismatch 
between personal need and the provision of resources as a state-
ment of personal ﬂaw. Self-esteem is further diminished, humili-
ation strengthened and the despair grips, suffocatingly, pulling 
the child further into exclusion.
 Whose responsibility is it to repair this dynamic? Who 
should take the initiative to exercise compassion? Who should 
step away from their worldview into the other? Opportunity-
providers often argue that the excluded should be more proac-
tive: ‘get on your bike and get a job’. Abraham Maslow, in the 
1960s, contributed to the answer. He conceived of a triangle, 
the pinnacle of which was self-actualisation – the space of aspi-
rational thinking. But he made it clear that unless the needs 
lower down the triangle were met, self-actualisation was not 
possible. The bottom of the triangle began with a need for food 
and safety, then a need for love further up and, when those 
primary physical and psychological thirsts had been quenched, 
the personal ‘I’ could look beyond itself to self-actualisation – a 
space where fulﬁlment allows the negation or rising above the 
self into a space of mutuality; where the personal, the divine and 
the other are not separated. 96 
 The compassionate person exercises the ability to self-
actualise but in the reverse. Rather than going up the triangle, 
the self-actualised agree to travel down it, in order to meet a 
fellow human being at a point of need. The gift is in being able 
96 A Maslow, Motivation and 
Personality, (Harper & Row, 
2nd ed. 1970).  
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to leave the self or rise beyond it and share, or be in a common 
space with another. The exhilaration is in the empathic experi-
ence. The living absolutely, undividedly, the moment where the 
opportunity-provider and the recipient are not separated. The 
mutuality of the experience has no room for power discrepan-
cies, and therefore there is no humiliation; no one is trapped, 
powerless, in the eyes of the powerful. Both are equally engaged 
around a task – the act of help from the perspective of the recip-
ients’ worldview.
 If the education provider could show curiosity as to why 
the pupil cannot make use of the opportunity, if there could 
be a suspension of judgment, if the intelligence in every piece 
of action could be respected, then the ‘urgent child’ would be 
able to explain that he does not come to the classroom with 
a psychological and emotional chemistry ready to take in the 
learning. Perhaps he would like to explain that he hates being 
a recipient, taking learning in, feels like an intrusion reminding 
him of the unwanted penetration of his childhood sexual abuse 
or the force-feeding of his crazed mother. He needs somewhere 
safe where the barrel of the drug dealer’s gun is not chasing 
him. Perhaps he feels too fragile, tentatively glued together in 
an encapsulated space to which he is frightened of allowing 
entry, for fear of being fragmented. Maybe being present in the 
classroom feels like being on display – all eyes noticing, regis-
tering, the ﬂawed presence, the persecutory voices of outsiders 
have now internalised into a tirade of self-hate, and every teach-
er’s glance is embroiled into the drama of shame. Perhaps he 
might want to let them know that he cannot be in the classroom 
for fear that his mother’s boyfriend may harm her, or his drug-
addicted father may suffocate in his own unprocessed vomit. 
 These are the preoccupations of the violated child whose 
classroom engagement is interfered with. But equally painful 
and poignant are the psychological disruptions experienced by 
children whose practical life circumstances may not be as visibly 
terrorising. The fear they harbour might be about not living 
up to expectations, being terriﬁed of being unloved because 
they are not becoming the objects of aspirational fantasy – their 
parents’ project. All these children have so much to share with 
us about the barriers to accessing opportunities, if only we had 
room to listen. 
 The richness and the aspiration that the opportunity-pro-
vider is seeking, the absolute sense of excellence and quality are 
mistakenly being pursued in the league tables. And yet perhaps 
it resides somewhere only humility can genuinely access, and in 
ﬁnding it one may be propelled into levels of excellence that are 
beyond the control-freakery masquerading as achievement. 
 So what makes the wall gateless and the path a meeting 
point? More than the computer and the state-of-the-art build-
ing, these children seek compassion. They need loving care from 
the soothing of which they can learn to calm themselves down. 
They need to be embraced from the ostracisation. Compassion, 
in the expression of which profound love is experienced; in the 
moment, when there is mutual experience of love there cannot 
be exclusion as there is no duality, no divide.
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9. The experience of Ninestiles 
School: a case study in making 
an educational difference 
Sir Dexter Hutt
Educational disadvantage need not be self-perpetuating: there 
are many individual examples of working class parents and ﬁrst 
generation immigrant parents with limited education them-
selves whose children have been successful in our education sys-
tem. But in the past this has been largely due to the determina-
tion and aspiration of these parents and often in spite of, rather 
than because of, our education system. 
 There has always been a moral imperative for fairness in life 
chances of all children, but this has not been enough to gener-
ate determination and aspiration on a national scale. Grammar 
schools provided a lifeline for some, but implicit in that system 
was an acceptance that the majority could be left with a level of 
education that would enable them to survive but not to progress 
much beyond their parents’ achievements. Until 1972 many 
could, and did, leave school at the age of ﬁfteen. Unskilled jobs 
were relatively plentiful and many (particularly boys) could and 
did follow their fathers into the traditional industries, like min-
ing, shipbuilding and the car industry.
 It was James Callaghan’s Ruskin College speech in October 
1976 that signalled the beginnings of a step change in national 
determination and aspiration, and much has happened since 
then with much increased government investment in schools, 
accompanied by unprecedented accountability through public 
inspections and public league tables. And, overall, standards 
have risen signiﬁcantly, with currently 62% of our population 
achieving ﬁve or more good GCSE passes at age sixteen. But 
that still leaves 38% of our students with a level of education 
that is unlikely to do much for their life chances. And the major-
ity of these are to be found among the most disadvantaged sec-
tions of society.
 Luckily for the current generation, the 21st century chal-
lenges are focusing our thinking. Sir Digby Jones, speaking 
at the end of 2005 in his role as Director General of the CBI, 
argued that the nineteenth century belonged to Britain, the 
twentieth century belonged to the United States, and the 21st 
century will belong to Asia. He went on to make the point that 
we can either equip ourselves, or we can leave our economy to 
a cold and frightening future. Equipping ourselves must surely 
include building an education system that reaches further and 
deeper than ever before – an education system that results in 
the average education level of our population being signiﬁcantly 
higher to support the development of skills appropriate to 
Britain’s needs in the 21st century. 
 So the good news is that the economic imperative has 
arrived and for the ﬁrst time in our history has combined with 
the ever-present moral imperative to raise our determination 
and aspiration for all of the current and future generations. 
Witness the government’s Every Child Matters agenda. But 
can we meet the challenge of raising the education level of our 
remaining 38% – among them the most disadvantaged sections 
of our society? How might we need to restructure our school 
system to make Every Child Matters a reality? And what lessons 
might we learn from pockets of existing school practice where 
disadvantage has been overcome?
 In 1988, a third of the students leaving Ninestiles School 
in the Acocks Green area of Birmingham left without a single 
GCSE pass; 9% of students left with ﬁve or more A - C passes. 
But in 2006, 82% of students gained ﬁve or more A* - C passes 
and Ninestiles was one of only two secondary schools in the 
region (the other one was a boys’ grammar school) identiﬁed by 
Ofsted as having had two consecutive outstanding inspections. 
Since 2001, Ninestiles has been accountable for three other 
secondary schools, all serving disadvantaged communities. Each 
of the three schools in turn became the most improved in their 
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local authority. So what have been the key strategic ingredients 
behind the improvement of these schools? And can they be rep-
licated on a wider scale?
 Ninestiles in 1988 existed in a different educational world, 
with little public accountability and very limited support from 
the local authority or the government. It was probably typical 
of many schools serving disadvantaged communities. The phys-
ical environment was poor – a run-down 1928 building, walls 
with peeling paint, rotting window frames and ﬂat roofs that 
leaked in many places. Teachers were happy with no sense of 
failure because of the overriding belief – common at that time – 
that schools could not overcome disadvantage and were victims 
of the areas that they served. Low expectations and little chal-
lenge from the local authority reinforced this belief. Ninestiles 
was heavily undersubscribed, with the majority of aspiring par-
ents in the area understandably choosing to send their sons and 
daughters elsewhere. The school tried to do its best by working 
to a rigidly streamed system, separating pupils by perceived 
ability into separate teaching groups. This enabled students who 
were considered to have potential to be taught in a separate top 
stream, and the school’s expectations of examination outcomes 
were inevitably focused on this group of 30 or so students. The 
result was a powerful self-labelling culture, with both students 
and teachers being labelled according to the stream they were 
in or that they taught. There was little incentive for teachers to 
work in teams or to reﬂect on teaching and learning. Outside 
of the top stream the vast majority of students responded to the 
low expectations with poor motivation and even poorer behav-
iour. Unsurprisingly, social relationships between students were 
poor: ﬁghting, swearing and racist name calling were prevalent. 
Parental expectation outside of the top stream was also very low 
– it was not uncommon for students to leave at the Easter of 
their ﬁnal year to take up unskilled jobs, often with the encour-
agement of their parents. The result in terms of examination 
outcomes was a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
 The new head who arrived in April 1988 identiﬁed improv-
ing social relationships as the key platform for improving moti-
vation and raising expectation, and the streamed system as the 
major structural block to this happening. HMI (Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of schools) was asked to recommend schools with 
good mixed ability practice in the different subject areas, and 
teams of teachers sent to visit these schools. In September 
1988 the streamed structure was dismantled and replaced with 
a mixed ability system. At the same time, the pastoral support 
was restructured to enable heads of year to move up with their 
students and have the opportunity to build relationships with 
parents over the ﬁve years of secondary schooling.
 The practice of teachers working largely on their own 
was changed by establishing faculty teams, with faculty heads 
made accountable not just for their own teaching but for that 
of all their team. Expectations of middle managers were made 
clear. Lesson observations were also introduced, with teach-
ers learning from watching each other teach and beginning to 
support each other. It was made clear that this was going to 
be an open culture characterised by accountability rather than 
blame. Teachers needing support were encouraged to seek help 
from their colleagues, and more skilled teachers were asked to 
help others. And it was also made clear that those who were 
not interested in improving their teaching skills should look 
elsewhere for employment. Some teachers left willingly, others 
required strong encouragement. But the overwhelming major-
ity stayed and became increasingly reﬂective about their own 
practice. Students responded positively to the better planned 
lessons. A spiral of rising expectations among both teachers and 
students began to emerge.
 Parental expectations were tackled through face-to-face 
meetings with parents at school and through home visiting, 
and photographs of every student who achieved were displayed 
in prominent areas so that they could not be missed by par-
ents who attended parents’ evenings and other such occasions. 
Parental expectation began to change as parents recognised the 
faces of achieving students who lived in the same street or had 
come from the same primary school as their own child.
 Senior staff appointed from within responded positively 
to the changes, and two new appointments at deputy head 
level were critical to maintaining the momentum. Senior team 
residential weekends to discuss and plan the school’s annual 
priorities within a rolling three-year developmental plan built 
up team spirit, a shared vision and a ‘can do’ culture. Whole-
school policies were agreed and then teams given the freedom 
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to be creative within the agreed framework. Innovation began to 
ﬂourish. And recruitment became easier as both experienced 
and younger teachers were attracted by the school’s momentum 
and willingness to embrace change. Jim Collins, author of the 
best-selling management book Good to Great, would argue that 
we were getting the right people on the bus.97
 The task of school leadership is to create a climate that 
teachers will respond to. Step one is to establish a platform 
of order that can support teaching and learning. It is highly 
demotivating for teachers to spend hours planning lessons and 
then ﬁnd that they are unable to deliver them because of poor 
behaviour in the classroom. Most schools have behaviour poli-
cies in theory but, in practice, the teacher in a classroom has 
to establish his or her own discipline. Ninestiles supported its 
teachers by implementing a whole-school discipline policy, 
behaviour for learning (BFL). Clear, simple rules for the class-
room and movement around the school were introduced and 
explained to students. Breaking the rules resulted in sequential 
consequences of increasing severity – the ﬁrst two consequences 
were simply warnings, but consequence three resulted in a 
one-hour detention. The key difference with other systems 
was that this detention was viewed as a sanction given by the 
teacher on behalf of the school. Detentions were therefore carried 
out centrally and supervised by a rota of teachers with all staff, 
including the head teacher, on the rota. Any student missing a 
detention was immediately followed up. It was important that 
BFL was perceived by students as consistent and fair – teachers 
were not allowed to ‘jump’ consequences, and students had the 
right of appeal. BFL was mirrored by a sequential praise system. 
Meetings were held with parents to explain the new behaviour 
system – this was a success and, indeed, some parents decided to 
adopt a similar approach at home.
 The school’s poor physical environment was improved. 
The building was painted, inside and outside, and leaking roofs 
repaired. Classrooms and corridors were carpeted. Toilets were 
refurbished. Display was given a high priority. This undoubt-
edly engendered a sense of pride among both staff and students, 
and added to the momentum of change. And it was a highly  
visible signal to parents and visitors that the school was  
changing. Changing the physical environment helped to raise 
expectations.
 Staff made increasing use of data to track pupil progress 
and to give pupils regular feedback on their progress. Teachers 
moved away from the generality of ‘work harder’ to offering 
subject-speciﬁc advice to students on what they needed to do to 
move up to the next national curriculum level. And the concept 
of ‘working at grades’ was introduced to GCSE students. This 
was different from the usual forecast grade. Instead, seven times 
during the two years of the course we asked teachers to assess 
the work that students had done to date, treating the part of 
the syllabus covered as if it were the whole of the GCSE. Each 
student then received their current set of working at grades, 
and this was followed up with a personal interview and advice 
on how to improve their grades in each subject. Students found 
this highly motivating. Each set of working at grades was then 
analysed in terms of overall results in each subject and in terms 
of the whole school ﬁve or more A*-C and A*-G grades. The 
power of working at grades is that the analysis prompted inter-
vention at every stage – at individual student level, faculty level 
and whole-school level. It enabled the school’s leadership to 
highlight areas of concern and to focus on identiﬁed students, 
identiﬁed classes and identiﬁed subjects. Interventions included 
additional parental meetings, the introduction of after-school 
classes and classes during the holiday periods. And many 
teachers came in voluntarily to take Saturday morning classes. 
Students became excited by their progress between sets of 
working at grades. The ﬁnal set of grades just before students 
sat their exams were virtually a forecast grade, since by that time 
the whole of the syllabus was covered. And the dominant emo-
tion when results day dawned on the third Thursday in August 
was delight rather than surprise.
 Underpinning all of our initiatives was the recognition that 
the school needed to win the hearts and minds of its students. 
The strategy for this was to take a service approach to students, 
role-playing the daily school experience from the students’ point 
of view. Teachers talked with students and listened to them. The 
school day was radically reorganised and a staggered morning 
break and lunchtime introduced. This meant that the whole 
97 J Collins, Good to Great 
(HarperCollins, 2001).
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school were not trying to get served at the same time. We prom-
ised students a queuing time of not more than ﬁve minutes, and 
made this possible by increasing the number of serving points 
and tills. A cashless system also reduced the queuing time. 
Morning break was abandoned in favour of morning break-
fast, with students choosing between cereals and a full English 
breakfast. Boys playing football tended to dominate the play 
areas, so the school quad became a girls’-only area. Lockers for 
all students meant they had somewhere to keep their personal 
possessions – it also meant that they did not have to carry their 
coats and heavy sets of books from classroom to classroom. A 
student phone was installed. Students had access to the library/
open learning centre before and after school. The equivalent 
of a customer services centre – a student support centre staffed 
by two support staff throughout the day, and the ﬁrst port of 
call for any student with a problem or a need – was an imme-
diate success. Daily whole-school assemblies with the whole 
student population in two sittings were introduced, enabling 
the school’s values to be reinforced on every working day. Staff 
delivering high quality assemblies that students looked forward 
to became the norm. 
 Leaving arrangements for year eleven students are a very 
good indicator of any school’s culture. At the start, like many 
schools, Ninestiles resorted to tricking students about the leav-
ing day, fearful that they would take the opportunity to get their 
own back on a school that they did not like. Much progress has 
been made since those days! Now the leaving day is publicised 
well in advance, and students themselves organise their leaving 
assembly to take the form of a concert with performances by 
their peers. They then get very dressed up in eveningwear for 
their prom at a hotel. And the tears that ﬂow freely, both at the 
leaving assembly and at the evening prom, are of joy and friend-
ship rather than frustration.
 Summarising the above, the key ingredients in effecting 
school improvement at Ninestiles were: a focus on building 
good social relationships within the school community; estab-
lishing an open, blame-free but highly accountable culture, 
which encourages risk taking and innovation; establishing 
teaching teams that are led as well as managed; a culture of 
high expectations and a shared vision that is understood by all; 
strong leadership to get the right people in the right posts; mak-
ing a statement with the physical environment; bringing parents 
on board with the school’s initiatives; implementing an effective 
discipline system mirrored with a praise system; giving students 
subject-speciﬁc rather than just general advice; using data to 
monitor student progress and to identify where intervention is 
needed; using the service approach to win the hearts and minds 
of students.
 Ninestiles has employed a combination of the above at 
three other schools serving highly disadvantaged communities 
that are or have been members of its federation over the last six 
years. It has been able to do so because it has been contractually 
accountable for the improvement of these schools. The combi-
nation that effectively gives the school its improvement strat-
egy is a question of judgement and will vary depending on the 
phase that a particular school is in. The ﬁrst federation school 
improved its ﬁve or more A*-C results from 16% to 75% over 
four years, the second school from 9% to 51% over three years. 
The third school, Central Technology College in Gloucester, 
a member of the federation from January 2006, improved its 
ﬁve or more A*-C pass rate from 24% to 49% in the six-month 
period to August 2006, making it the most improved school in 
the county.
 We can conclude that schools serving disadvantaged com-
munities can improve and the rate of improvement is likely 
to be more rapid if they are supported by a successful school 
with an understanding of school improvement strategies. This 
arrangement increases both the leadership and risk-taking 
capacity of the school. It also provides a pool of teaching exper-
tise that can be used to support the disadvantaged school. But 
to be effective, the partnership does need to be a formal one 
with built-in accountability. Government policies that support 
such structured and accountable partnerships could make a sig-
niﬁcant contribution to ensuring that for many children educa-
tional disadvantage is not self-perpetuating. 
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